A Deterrence Framework[1]

Step 1. Identify antagonists, issue, objectives, and actions.
    1.1 Antagonists
    1.2 Issue
    1.3 Adversary's objectives
    1.4 Actions to be deterred
    1.5 U.S. objectives

Step 2. Identify and describe those factors likely to affect the adversary's decision making in the context of this specific flashpoint and U.S. deterrent threats.
    2.1 Degree of rationality and predictability as indicated by past behavior
    2.2 Leadership characteristics
        2.2.1 Individuals with responsibilities for the issue at hand
        2.2.2 Leadership motivations
        2.2.3 Leadership determination
        2.2.4 Operational code (worldview and strategic style)
        2.2.5 Political-psychological profiles of key decision makers
        2.2.6 Adversary's understanding of and attention to the U.S.
            2.2.6.1 Previous interactions with the U.S.
            2.2.6.2 Attention to U.S. declaratory policy
            2.2.6.3 Likelihood the adversary will (mis)comprehend U.S. demands and threats
    2.3 Value and cost/risk structure
        2.3.1 Location of the issue in the value hierarchy of the adversary's leadership
        2.3.2 Other relevant values of the adversary's leadership
        2.3.3 Cost/risk tolerance of the adversary's leadership with regard to this issue
    2.4 Options
        2.4.1 Military options available to the adversary
        2.4.2 Adversary's freedom to conciliate or provoke
    2.5 Adversary's belief about the costs the U.S. will incur if its deterrent threat is executed
        2.5.1 Costs from the adversary's retaliation
        2.5.2 Political costs at home and abroad
    2.6 Communications
        2.6.1 Optimal method for communicating with the adversary
        2.6.2 Possibilities for misperception
    2.7 Credibility of U.S. threats
        2.7.1 Past pledges or actions demonstrating U.S. commitments
        2.7.2 Other special circumstances

Step 3. Construct a strategic profile of the adversary with regard to the crisis in question.
    3.1 Predictability of the adversary's behavior

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[1] From, Keith B. Payne, *The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2001) pp. 112-114. The late Professor Colin Gray said of this work, "Not many books have the potential to make the difference between war and peace: Keith Payne's latest expedition into deterrence country is one such."

    3.2   Cost/risk tolerance
    3.3   Influence of considerations beyond immediate issue
    3.4   Will, determination, and freedom to conciliate or provoke
    3.5   Cognizance of U.S. demands and threats
    3.6   Credibility of U.S. deterrent threats
    3.7   Susceptibility to U.S. deterrent threats

Step 4. Assess whether the challenger is likely to be susceptible to deterrence policies in this particular case, and, if so, the nature of those policies.

Step 5. Identify available U.S. deterrence policy options.
    5.1   U.S. policy
    5.2   Punitive or denial threats
    5.3   Military actions
    5.4   Related diplomatic steps
    5.5   Means for communicating threats
    5.6   Likely adversary reactions and implications for options
    5.7   Indicators for determining option effectiveness
    5.8   Opportunities for learning
    5.9   Possible real-time modifications to improve option effectiveness
    5.10 Domestic and allied constraints on U.S. actions
    5.11 Expected results

Step 6. Identify the gap between the likely requirements for deterrence and available U.S. deterrence policy options. Describe different, new, or additional military capabilities and policies that may be needed.
    6.1   Key military capabilities for supporting the deterrent options most suited to the challenger in this case
    6.2   Related declaratory policy and diplomatic measures

In no case could the collection of the desired information outlined above be fully accomplished. All attempts to become so well-informed in each of these potentially key areas will be frustrated to a greater or lesser degree by a lack of data, ambiguous data, conflicting data, and the possible intentional disinformation campaigns of some adversaries. The point here is to reduce the margin of ignorance, and to be more aware of what is not known, so that U.S. deterrence policies can be established on a more informed basis, and thus be more likely to work in practice.