MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF THE TREATY ON THE LIMITATIONS OF ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT ON LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

Dr. William R. Van Cleave, associate professor, School of Politics and International Relations, University of Southern California, Testimony before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, July 25, 1972

The committee met, pursuant to recess at 10:05 a.m., in room 114, New Senate Office Building, Hon. John C. Stennis, chairman.

Present: Senators Stennis (presiding) and Jackson.

Also present: John T. Ticer, chief clerk; Nancy Bearg, research assistant, and Richard Perle, special assistant to Senator Jackson.

The CHAIRMAN: The committee will please come to order.

We are glad to have our visitors here this morning. This is an open session and we will proceed immediately.

We are pleased to have with us this morning a witness who has been intimately involved in planning for the SALT talks and who brings to his testimony today a keen analysis of the central issues in SALT. Since advising the SALT delegation, Dr. Van Cleave has had an opportunity to reflect objectively and with detachment on U.S. policy at SALT.

Dr. William R. Van Cleave is now associate professor, School of Politics and International Relations at the University of Southern California, a post he has held since 1967. Dr. Van Cleave initially began research in nuclear arms deterrence in 1964 at the Strategic Studies Center of the Sanford Research Institute, where he is currently a consultant. During a leave of absence from the University of Southern California from 1969 to 1971, he was special assistant, Office of the Secretary of Defense. In this capacity he served as an advisor to the U.S. SALT delegation.

Dr. Van Cleave’s publications have appeared in many leading military and strategic journals including Survival, Military Review, U.S. Naval Institution Proceedings, and Nuclear Journal.

Doctor, may I add a word of welcome here. I am glad that you could come and that you are going to testify. I regret exceedingly, though, that I will not be able to stay. I am floor manager of the military procurement bill that is the pending business in the Senate now, and I am
compelled to report to the Senate floor in the next few minutes. But I certainly will follow your testimony completely and I am sure it will be of value.

With that understanding, I am going to ask you and the committee to excuse me now for this other urgent and demanding duty and my interest is certainly continuing with your testimony.

Senator Jackson (presiding). Dr. Van Cleave, you may proceed with your statement and we will have a period of questioning.

STATEMENT OF DR. WILLIAM R. VAN CLEAVE, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, SCHOOL OF POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

Dr. Van Cleave. Mr. Chairman, I regard it as a privilege to have the opportunity to discuss the proposed strategic arms agreements with you and to give you my views on them. Needless to say, my views are solely personal ones.

I apologize for the lengthy and somewhat repetitious nature of my written statement. It was hastily prepared. I will submit it but only summarize it in my remarks.

In the testimony so far you have heard two contrasting general approaches to the evaluation of these agreements.

SALT PROMISSORY IN NATURE

The administration and other supporters of the agreements have argued essentially that, whatever the defects of the agreements, they do constitute a worthwhile first step that will promote future agreements more clearly beneficial to the United States. They are basically promissory in nature. In addition, while the interim agreement does allow much higher levels of launchers and total throw weight or payload for the Soviet Union, and does give the Soviets considerable latitude in area defense for the United States and limited defense of retaliatory forces to only one ICBM site, the balance of forces established is still better than a no-agreement case. This argument compares the agreement levels with presumed 5-year no-agreement levels—it purposely ignores any comparison of agreement levels with levels that existed at the beginning of SALT—and holds that the agreements halt Soviet momentum and thereby curb the “arms race.”

Those who are unhappy with the agreements point to the specific terms of the agreements and their effect on U.S. strategic and political interests. While the extent to which the agreements will be promotional of further agreements is anyone’s guess—the possibility must be allowed—but the evidence that good agreements will grow out of unsatisfactory
ones and that the Soviets will be any more willing in SALT II than they were in SALT I to ease U.S. strategic problems is scant indeed. This approach is skeptical of hypothetical nonagreement projections and prefers to deal with the actual projections derivable from the agreements, which are really not much different from the nonagreement projections previously used the administration. What now is most threatening are the normally expected improvements in Soviet forces, which the agreements seem to encourage. Moreover, the comparison that should be made is with the balance that existed when SALT began and earlier U.S. expectations about SALT. These comparisons show a rapid process of erosion of the strategic balance in favor of the Soviet Union, and apparently a similar erosion of U.S. SALT positions and expectations.

AGREEMENTS UNSATISFACTORY IN AND OF THEMSELVES

The gap between these two approaches is bridged by the administration’s acknowledgment, made most clearly by the SALT delegation, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the agreements in and of themselves are unsatisfactory unless certain future conditions are met. On May 9, the delegation formally warned that if “an agreement providing for more complete strategic offensive arms limitations were not achieved within 5 years, U.S. supreme interests could be jeopardized” and that the United State would then have to withdraw from the agreements. The Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have insisted that the agreements are acceptable only if a vigorous R. & D. program and modernization of permitted strategic forces are conducted, the B-1 and ULMS are funded, and safeguards are built for the possibility of abrogation.

The apparent inconsistency between arguing, on the one hand, that the agreements “provide for a more stable strategic balance” and constitute “an important first step in checking the arms race,” and, on the other hand, that the agreements are tolerable only if such conditions are met, is eased by the recognition that the agreements are a calculated risk designed to enhance the prospects of a better agreement. Despite all of the rhetoric about how these agreements improve the strategic situation and curb arms competition—they do neither—the real argument for them boils down to, first, their promotional value, and, second, that value being worth the risks and disadvantages they entail.

What I would first say is that if you find these agreements acceptable—if the Senate consents to them, as I believe it undoubtedly will—it is essential that you recognize the calculated risk nature of the agreements and reflect that recognition in your advice on them, and in your subsequent handling of defense appropriations.

Agreements of this nature inherently include many uncertainties and ambiguities, combining prices to be paid, risks to be taken, and hopefully opportunities to be created. Any position taken on agreements, for or against, must be taken on balance. It cannot be unqualified. Your vote will have to be yes or no. If it is yes, I would argue that it must be
“Yes, but...” and the but should be reflected in the required support for safeguards, defense programs, and the mandatory limited time of the interim agreement.

That, in my view, is the necessary minimum condition for acceptance of these agreements.

**SALT GIVES UP TOO MUCH**

Personally, of the two general approaches I described, I believe the second to be the more valid and to represent the closer approximation to truth. This will make it clear from the outset that I do not believe that we have good or sufficient reason to be happy with these agreements. I will go another step. Dr. Teller, as I understand, has agreed that we should not be happy with the agreements, but nevertheless—because we are left with little else we can do—we should accept them. In fact, that actually seems to be what the administration collectively is saying. I believe that, on balance, the agreements give up too much and are more likely to be detrimental to U.S. security and U.S. foreign relations than beneficial. Consequently, I could not personally recommend that they be approved and ratified.

I want to make it clear that that is my personal point of view for reasons set forth below. I wish also to be clear that I do not believe it is a very realistic position to maintain at this time. I do not support the agreements, but I really cannot imagine them, having been negotiated and signed by the President, being rejected by the Senate. I register my dissent to let you know that not everyone believes the agreements are in the best interests of the United States.

The most useful approach at this point of time would undoubtedly be for us to examine realistically the drawbacks of the agreements so that we are very clear about the risks being assumed, and then to turn to how we best provide for essential U.S. interests in the presence of the agreements and how we approach the next phase of SALT. I believe that our strategic problems with the Soviet Union and our problems in negotiating arms limitation agreements should be frankly open and understood if there is to be any prospect of future success. Personally, I am sorry that the full record of SALT cannot be made available to the public.

I would like to set forth now some general observations or points of view elaborating on what I have said and giving some of the reasons for my concern.

**SALT DOES NOT SOLVE US. STRATEGIC PROBLEMS**

1. The agreements are not of themselves good arms limitations agreements. Acceptance of them should not lead to the position that they are in themselves good agreements or promote complacency. The Defense Department is absolutely correct in insisting that acceptance of these agreements requires reinvigorated R. & D. and modernization programs. Those who have attacked these programs as inconsistent with strategic arms limitation should direct
their unhappiness at the agreements, not at the proposition that they require such safeguards.

It should be made very clear that the agreements do not solve or even ease our strategic force problems. They do not arrest the expected development of the threat or competition in strategic arms. They do, unfortunately, accept higher numerical levels of the threat than we ever before contemplated and do restrict at the same time U.S. ability to cope with the threat. Their tendency, therefore, is toward less rather than more stability. Unless our expectations of their promotional value are shortly fulfilled and unless in the meantime we push compensatory programs, there is a strong risk that they could be wildly destabilizing.

**EROSION IN U.S. POSITION**

2. The current agreements, taken together, are in fact a light year removed from the outcomes contemplated in the studies and planning for SALT in 1969. While I cannot discuss earlier U.S. positions or proposals in open hearings, I believe I can say on the basis of information already publicly revealed that these agreements do not resemble those deemed acceptable in 1969 or 1970. There has since the start of SALT been a constant erosion of U.S. SALT positions and expectations.

I state this frankly not to criticize the delegation or those responsible for decisions during the course of the talks, but to point out that, while we were engaged in SALT, the strategic balance continued to deteriorate rapidly, and to suggest that arms negotiations are a process in and of themselves, and that erosion of positions and expectations should be expected. I think that it is important for us to be aware of this in our approach to SALT II.

Moreover, the observation that such erosion occurred does not necessarily imply that it was wise or unwise, right or wrong. The criticism has been levied that concession after concession was made in the pursuit of an agreement. But specific concessions may be good or bad depending upon their nature, the available alternatives, and the eventual outcome. The agreements have to stand or fall on their own merits in the final analysis.

The same record shows that the United States tried to achieve better agreements but that more worthwhile ones (from our point of view) were rebuffed by the Soviet Union. Changes in U.S. positions or expectations may be regarded as erosion or as an attempt to find a common denominator upon which the two sides could agree.

A brief review of the course of SALT, based upon the public record, might help one draw his own conclusions.
INITIAL POSITION OF SALT

As SALT was about to begin in November 1969, the declared objective was to negotiate an agreement that would stabilize the balance at the same relative position that then existed. At that time, the Soviet Union had about the same number of ICBM launchers as the United States (some 1,040) and had just begun deployment of modern Y-class submarines and SLBM’s. A freeze at that time would have preserved some U.S. numerical advantage.

In the spring of 1970, according to the President’s foreign policy reports, the United States set forth in the talks two alternative comprehensive agreements, one that would include qualitative limitations, including MIRV, and one that would involve actual reductions in strategic offensive forces. When it became clear that the Soviet side was interested in neither approach, according to the President, the United States submitted a changed position taking into account Soviet objections. That proposal, known as the August 4 proposal, has not been made public, but according to press reports would have established equal levels of offensive forces limited at about the situation that then prevailed. With that proposal, equal ceilings then were substituted for a freeze that, would have preserved some U.S. edge.

It is quite clear that the Soviet Union was not then, and has not been at any time since SALT began, interested in such equality, or in agreements at those levels. The Soviet approach in the meantime, according to the President, remained very general and unspecific (“lacked the specificity and detail to permit firm conclusions about overall impact”), and focused upon a definition of “strategic” systems that would limit U.S. forward-based theater forces (but not those of the Soviet Union) rather than giving priority to the core strategic offensive systems. The U.S.S.R. also wanted a separate ABM limitation agreement.

At the same time, the U.S. position on ABM limitations continued to be that defensive limitations depended upon offensive levels permitted by any agreement. The United States might be willing to forego a light area defense in return for an agreement stabilizing the United States-U.S.S.R. strategic balance, but levels of defense of retaliatory systems depended upon the level of the threat.

In May 1971, the President acknowledged a deadlock, which, in an attempt to break, we would agree to concentrate “on working out an agreement for the limitation of deployment of antiballistic missile systems.” Such an agreement would be accompanied by “certain measures with respect to the limitation of offensive strategic weapons.”

At that time, the Soviet Union reportedly had about 1,450 ICBM’s and 400 SLBM’s operational or under construction. News reports at the time speculated that the new U.S. position would freeze existing levels of ICBM and SLBM launchers and give an equal choice to each side of defending either its national capital (NCA defense) or three ICBM sites. (That
level of ICBM defense presumably being necessary with those levels of strategic offensive forces.)

Now, the interim agreement on offensive forces permits the Soviet Union (by our calculations) something over 1,600 fixed ICBM launchers and 740 SLBM launchers on modern nuclear-powered submarines (or up to 62 boats or 950 SLBM’s through substitutions for certain old systems). Neither diesel missile launching submarines nor existing types of SLBM’s on such submarines are limited. The ABM Treaty would limit U.S. defense of its retaliatory forces to one ICBM site and would permit the United States to deploy a defense around Washington, an option that does not seem likely to be picked up.

One way of putting this is that in 2 1/2 years of SALT the United States has managed to trade away Safeguard, and most of the important options to assure retaliatory force survivability, for a doubling of the threat. Another observation is that if the news accounts of a year ago were correct, in 1 year’s time the United States has changed from insisting on defense of three ICBM sites compared with a somewhat lower threat and Soviet defense of Moscow, to what in practical terms will be on one ABM site for us against a larger threat and the equivalent of three ABM sites for the Soviet Union (considering that, according to public testimony, the Moscow defense may also defend some 300 ICBM launchers).

One might suggest that, on the basis of this record, future Soviet historians could regard this as the golden age of Soviet negotiation. Two other points emerge from this.

**INCOMPATIBILITY OF ABM TREATY AND INTERIM AGREEMENT**

First, an enormous change has taken place since the beginning of SALT. SALT 1972 is not SALT 1969. That may lend weight to the argument that we had best accomplish whatever we can now. It might also help put these agreements, and the strategic situation—and the process of negotiating arms limitations—in perspective. It certainly shows that there is ample ground for disappointment in what has been achieved in SALT and for insisting that we look to our own solution of strategic problems rather than primarily to SALT.

Second, it suggests that the ABM treaty and the agreement on offensive forces are not complementary but are incompatible. They do not go together. We are cornering levels of ABM with levels of ABM and offensive levels with offensive levels, which is politically important and which may be strategically important, but which blurs the really significant offensive-defensive relationships and the need to match defense to offense and vice versa. If ABM is to be limited as stipulated by the Treaty, the offensive capability is to be permitted, higher levels of ABM are necessary to protect our retaliatory forces and other survivability options should not be precluded.
SOVIET OFFENSIVE SUPERIORITY

3. The offensive limitations agreement clearly does allow Soviet offensive force superiority.

It could be argued that the agreements do not themselves grant this superiority but only recognize an existing situation and at least freeze it before it becomes worse. There are major problems with that view:

First, politically and psychologically it is going substantially beyond recognition of the existing balance for the U.S. Congress formally to consent to it and for the U.S. Government formally to ratify it. To the world, we seem to be not only assuring an adverse balance but to be giving it our stamp of approval, codifying it as the law of the land, amid proclaiming it to all. This cannot help but have a deleterious effect on our foreign relations.

As the Secretary of Defense testified just last February, drawing upon only one force component as an example: “if we were placed in an inferior position where the Soviet Union would have substantially more ballistic missile submarines than the United States had, for instance, using this as an example, this could have a tremendous effect upon the future course of the United States from a foreign policy standpoint and from the standpoint of the will and determination of the United States.” That is essentially what the third Sufficiency Criterion means. Yet, the agreement accepts that unhappy situation.

Many will find in U.S. acceptance of these agreements acceptance of a position of relative weakness for the decade of the 1970’s, and will make their foreign policy decisions accordingly. It will seem to affirm that the United States is entering a period of introversion. The effects of this might be lessened somewhat by clear evidence that we do not intend to accept this permanently, but the acceptance of the terms of these agreements nonetheless will tend to be a dramatic testament to new Soviet strength and U.S. weakness.

THE CHANGING STRATEGIC BALANCE

Second, the terms of the agreements themselves could well make the balance more adverse than it now is by permitting the U.S.S.R. to build up its strategic offensive and defensive forces well beyond the existing situation, and by denying to the United States options necessary to cope with the growth and provide safe force survivability. While it is hoped that U.S. modernization programs will not be slowed by these agreements, the terms of the agreements do allow the threat to increase considerably and do require that the United States refrain from force survivability options during the lifetime of the agreement.

Third, to conclude that the situation 5 years from now would be much worse without these agreements requires the dual assumption that the Soviets will continue to deploy new ICBM’s and SLBM’s at a rate comparable to or higher than that of recent years (and that this
represents more of a risk than Soviet force modernization), and that the United States does nothing in response. Yet, the President has suggested that we would do quite a lot of response (an additional $15 billion per year more) if there were no agreements. It is difficult to see how these agreements change the threat $15 billion per year worth. In fact, while limiting such U.S. response, the agreements do not much change the expected 1975-77 threat. If the Soviets do a lot in the presence of the agreements, and we do comparatively little—as seems probable—the agreements could lead to a situation in 1977 much worse than that without the agreements.

The case that the situation would be worse 5 years from now without these agreements is based upon new projections that the Soviets would build 1,000 more ICBM’s over the next 5 years and would increase their fleet of Y-class submarines to over 90. This is not only a curious reversal of past perennial predictions that such construction would soon level off and stop (the President has earlier wondered why the Soviets should want higher levels of launchers), it seems inconsistent with preagreement projections and expressions of concern.

From the last 2 years’ Defense reports we get a picture of Soviet ICBM launcher construction coming to a stop, with no evidence that we expected—in the absence of these agreement—ICBM silo construction at the rate of 200 per year for 5 years. This year’s report stated that the Soviets may have completed the construction of SS-9s, 11s, and 13s.

Y-class submarine construction, in contrast, was expected to continue at the present rate, which Dr. Kissinger has given as eight boats per year. In the spring of 1971 before this committee, the Secretary of Defense reported that the number of Soviet Y-boats “could reach 50 by mid-1975.” At eight per year, that would imply 66, 5 years from now, not 90. This year’s Defense report projects 41 to 42 boats by the end of 1973, which implies come 69 boats 5 years from now if the Soviets were to continue their present rate of rapid construction. This range of projections is far from the now suggested 90 boats but not a lot different from the 62 boats permitted the Soviet Union by the terms of the agreement. And, so far as I can tell, the agreement sets no limits on the number of Y-class submarines the Soviets could have in various stages of completion at the end of the 5-year period.

By contrast, in this year’s Defense Report, the Secretary of Defense emphasized not an expected continued buildup of strategic offensive missile levels so much as their expected improvement, which the agreement follows. He stated that “future significant development in Soviet forces will probably lie in qualitative improvements,” which, he said, constitute our “greatest concern.” Similarly, in this year’s State of the World message, the President observed that “The Soviet forces, even at current levels, have the potential of threatening our land based ICBM’s.” He further stated that the Soviets have the necessary technology for such improvements.
Finally, it must be concluded that, because of these considerations, the agreements do not promise a better situation 5 years from now, due to the agreements, nor do they themselves prevent a deterioration of the situation. Only we can do that.

SOVIET OBJECTIVES NOT KNOWN

4. We do not have as firm a foundation of knowledge about Soviet programs and capabilities as implied by the agreements or suggested by Dr. Kissinger at the Moscow press conference. And, despite 2 ½ years of strategic arms limitation talks, we certainly have no clear idea of Soviet objectives.

We are unable to know all we need to know about the qualitative capabilities of Soviet weapons systems, much less the nature and direction of Soviet R. & D., far less the extent of Soviet knowledge and the nature of Soviet interest in strategic forces. We have not been very good at predicting Soviet technology and objectives. Such matters are inherently uncertain. Our ability to assess Soviet weapons development contains many gaps, even in such critical areas as radar capability, missile accuracy, ballistic missile defense capability of SAM systems, warheads, and space activities. In testimony last year, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy acknowledged that “We have little knowledge of the Soviet warhead designs, of their vulnerability, or of Soviet testing and development philosophy.”

ERRORS IN PAST ESTIMATES

Our projections of Soviet objectives and future capabilities have been seriously in error many times, a fact that should make us a bit humble about current projections and expectations. In 1965, even after the Soviet ICBM buildup had begun, Secretary of Defense McNamara publicly stated that the Soviets clearly had no intention of trying to close the gap in strategic forces or to compete quantitatively with the United States. Our projections of the Soviet buildup over the past several years regularly had it leveling off and stopping at far lower levels than were actually attained. When the buildup continued, we then predicted that the Soviet objective was to narrow the gap somewhat; then we predicted that it was, at most, to reach a rough equality in numerical ICBM levels (never in SLBM levels); and then to obtain an overall parity so that strategic arms limitations reflecting that parity could be reached.

The President recalled in his Foreign Policy Report this year that in 1969, we looked upon the drawing abreast of the Soviet Union in strategic forces as the opportunity for strategic arms limitations that would, for the first time, reflect a genuine parity. The Secretary of State acclaimed SALT in the fall of 1969 as the means to preserve the balance that then existed. The Secretary of Defense acknowledged in 1970, that we had not responded to the Soviet buildup because we believed that it was aimed at most at achieving numerical parity.
The fact is that all of our preparations for SALT in 1969 were based upon the premise, since proved erroneous, that the Soviet goal was only to narrow or at most overcome the strategic gap, that the Soviets had attained a strategic position satisfactory to them, and that Soviet willingness to engage in strategic arms limitation talks reflected the seriousness of their desire to reach an agreement establishing that position. The motivations we generally attributed to them, for no good reason, were mirror-image projections of our own principally based upon mutual assured destruction concepts and pressure of nondefense economic imperatives.

Neither the SALT record nor Soviet activities since SALT began supports such a premise.

DIFFERENCES IN U.S. AND SOVIET STRATEGIC DOCTRINE

5. Similarly, our uncertainty concerning Soviet strategic concepts remains greater than our knowledge, yet we continue to assume in our strategic and SALT planning that Soviet concepts and objectives are similar to our own. The weight of available evidence, I believe strongly suggests the opposite.

For some time in the United States it has been commonly believed that there are certain truths about strategic stability and the optimum strategic relationship, which only need to be learned to be accepted. We have tried to read our truths into Soviet activities. Where they did not fit it was a matter of Soviet error or misunderstanding, rather than a deliberate, considered, or final rejection of these truths. Little thought seems to have been given to the political insensitive of these truths or to the fact that they were formulated in a different set of conditions than we face in the 1970’s. The development of hardened silo launches for ICBM’s and subsurface launching of missiles from submarines, together with an early stage in the development of missile accuracies and ASW capabilities, seemed to guarantee the survivability of second-strike retaliatory forces. ABM was undeveloped and, compared to money spent for offensive forces, unpromising. There were a few good prospects for damage limiting, for counterforce, and if one assumed that any efforts in those directions would only precipitate offsetting measures there was little reason to pursue such efforts. All of this led to the sanctity of assured destruction concepts, which—if followed by both sides—would lead to stability based upon mutual assured destruction. As Senator Brooke put it, “mutual deterrence depends on mutual vulnerability. It is in neither side’s interest to threaten the other side’s retaliatory forces.”

Yet, developing a counterforce capability that threatens U.S. retaliatory forces is precisely what the Soviet Union has been doing. There is little evidence that the Soviets share our views on stability and preferred strategic relationships. And I know of nothing in the SALT record or the record of Soviet strategic force activities that persuades me that they do.
One of the major changes that should be made in approaching the next phase of SALT is in our general assumption of similarity of strategic concepts and objectives, or even compatibility of them.

**POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF SOVIET STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY**

6. There is a growing recognition that the Soviets would realize and exploit a political advantage from some form of strategic superiority or from the stalemate of U.S. strategic power. This itself is a reversal of the long prevailing notion in the U.S. that strategic forces confer no political benefits and have no political utility. The recognition is belated, but perhaps not so much that it is not useful to the formulation of U.S. and Allied policies. The realization that strategic superiority of the type the Soviet Union now seems to be seeking might also be usable militarily absorbs, I know, a good deal of the energies of the Department of Defense, but is not very widely accepted. One can only hope that the general recognition of this possibility is not too late.

Few seem to recognize this as a problem, probably due to lack of appreciation of the nature of the Soviet strategic buildup and to a residual conviction that deterrence will continue to exist and render a first strike irrational. Yet, Soviet strategic force development points clearly toward a possible future capability for a substantially disarming first strike with a fraction of the total force, enabling an overwhelming assured destruction capability to be held in reserve. Even if U.S. calculations show that surviving U.S. forces would retain some magical assured destruction capability (20 to 25 percent fatalities?), the question remains whether the United States would respond in such fashion given its reduced force, and only call down greater retaliatory destruction on itself. In other words, instead of the simple model of aggressive Soviet first strike and U.S. retaliation, we may face a situation where the Soviets could strike first and still retain their own assured destruction retaliatory force, leaving the United States in the position of being the initiator of nuclear war against civilian populace, and the Soviet Union in the position of being a retaliator. This is to what the President referred when he asked in his 1970 foreign policy statement if a President should “in the event of a nuclear attack, be left with the single option of ordering the mass destruction of enemy civilians, in the face of the certainty that it would be followed by the mass slaughter of Americans?” In his 1971 foreign policy statement, he emphatically rejected this—yet, it is precisely the situation we seem headed toward, and one that these agreements promise to ratify.

**INTERIM AGREEMENT CANNOT BE PERMANENT**

7. Because of all of these considerations, as I suggested at the outset, acceptance of these agreements must actually be based on the premise that the interim agreement is in fact interim and will lead directly to a better agreement. The agreements must be believed to be both interim and promotional of better agreements in the near future, or, as the delegation
stated, “U.S. supreme interests could be jeopardized.” Further, as I have argued, the minimal condition for the acceptance of these agreements is the pursuit of the programs not disallowed by the agreements, including R. & D. and modernization.

That these agreements will promote the necessary follow-on agreements is possible. But this is only a promise, and we must recognize, first, that time promise may not be fulfilled, and, second, that its chances will be affected by what we do and do not do.

There is certainly ground for pessimism. If two and a half years of “serious and businesslike” negotiation would produce only these agreements, one may doubt the prospects that more beneficial agreements will necessarily follow. The President seemed to share this pessimism in his 1971 Foreign Policy Report when he said, “If all the effort that has gone into SALT were to produce only a token agreement, it could be counterproductive. There would be no reason to be confident that this could serve as a bridge to a more significant agreement.”

When so much has been placed on the promise of a follow-on agreements justifying the risks of those agreements, we must very seriously consider the prospects of the Soviets agreeing to a future agreement that would correct the defects of the first and rescue the United States from a difficult situation. Why should they give up in SALT II what they gained or refused to give up in SALT I?

**U.S. POSITION WEAKER IN SALT II**

We will be entering SALT II relatively in a much weaker position than we entered SALT I. That is indisputable. What leverage will we have to encourage the negotiation of a corrective follow-on agreement? The only leverage we can possibly have, and the only prospect of a successful outcome for SALT II (however minimal), will be the clear demonstration that we intend to push forward to improve our forces and solve our own strategic problems in the presence of these agreements. If we do not show that we intend to disallow the Soviets meaningful superiority and substantial counterforce capabilities, I do not see that the Soviet Government will have much incentive to reach an agreement limiting those capabilities.

8. Finally, to wax a bit philosophically, we have clearly attributed too much to SALT and to what could be accomplished through strategic arms limitation agreements. From past official statements, the writings of some arms control specialists, and the news media, the theme issued that SALT represented about the last chance to do something about strategic arms control and the penalty for failing to do that something or other would be very high. The putative benefits from a SALT agreement and the dire consequences attributed to non-apocalyptic in nature at times. This has been an exaggeration in the extreme. Inasmuch as the strategic balance and the state of our security 5 years from now will be determined more by what we do and not do than by the agreements concluded—although, in my opinion, the agreements may make the handling of these problems more difficult—one may wonder
whether the real significance of the agreements lies in what they reflect rather than what they do.

UNITED STATES LACKS COHERENT NATIONAL STRATEGY

For various reasons, we have been unable to face realistically and cope with a dramatically changing strategic balance. We have not been able to firm up and hold to a coherent, agreeable national strategy, or to offer our citizens a strategic objective better than the guarantee of their assured destruction should deterrence fail. We have not even been able to maintain the four minimum criteria for strategic sufficiency that were determined just 3 years ago. We do not even use them as a measure of the effectiveness, success, or failure of these agreements.

We are evaluating these arguments by the narrow, shortsighted, and subminimal criterion of whether they leave us with an assured destruction capability. We are, in other words, using what was originally intended to be one analytical tool to use in evaluating forces as the sole strategic objective. And it appears that our energies over the next few years will be devoted primarily to the maintenance of that capability.

I do not believe that we can afford to rely upon assured destruction as the sole standard of strategic force sufficiency. Nor should we allow the Soviet Union a counterforce capability, measurable superiority, or the ability to limit our strategic flexibility and to coerce. The trends seem to be however, that we are doing all of that. I cannot imagine that most U.S. citizens will long remain satisfied with this situation.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SITUATION WITH AND WITHOUT SALT

Senator JACKSON. Thank you, Dr. Van Cleave, for an excellent presentation here this morning.

I have a number of questions that I would like to ask.

One method of assessing the impact of the SALT accords on Soviet programs would be to compare what they are free to do under the agreement with what we have projected that they might have done in the agreement. Speaking generally, and without getting into precise estimates, how does the lower end of the spectrum of official estimates of the Soviet strategic offensive force for mid-1977 compare with the force permitted the Soviets under the SALT accords?
Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Senator I don’t think there is much difference in these two levels. It depends upon what estimates and what projections we look at. The argument that the situation would be much worse 5 years from now is based on new projections that the Soviets would build 1,000 more ICBM launchers in the next 5 years and build up to a level of 90 or more Y-class submarines. As I stated this is a curious change from past perennial predictions that such construction would not continue at the rates we experienced in the 1965 to 1969 period. According to the last two defense reports and other pre-agreement public reports, except for construction activity related to a new, heavier ICBM, Soviet ICBM launchers construction slowing down with no evidence that we expect ICBM silo construction at the rate of 200 per year in 5 years. Y-class submarine construction, of course, was expected to continue at the present rate but Dr. Kissinger has given us eight boats a year. As I noted in my statement, recent, preagreement projections seemed to place expected levels of Y-boats 5 years from now in the neighborhood of 66 to 69 at that production rate.

It is clear that for the past 2 years expected modernization of Soviet forces has been regarded as most likely contingency and the greatest matter of concern to us and this is not at all stopped by the agreements. The significant and disturbing fact is that the threat permitted by the agreements, no matter with what it is compared, is too great particularly when we have denied ourselves important counter-measures.

Senator JACKSON. That is especially true of the land-based ICBM forces.

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Yes, sir.

Senator JACKSON. Have estimates been subordinated to the need to defend the SALT agreements?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. I have no way of answering that question.

Senator JACKSON. One begins to wonder, though, when one looks at what has been used to support the administration’s momentum argument.

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. I have no knowledge of the reasons or basis for the projections given, although to one on the outside their credibility does not appear very great. I do not think they contribute to a proper evaluation of the agreements.

RETROFITTING OF SS-9’S

Senator JACKSON. The Soviets are very likely going to deploy a new missile as a follow-on to the SS-9. Under the terms of the interim agreement they are free to retrofit their 313 heavy silos to accommodate this new missile. How would the deployment of 313 new “heavy”
ICBM’s over the next 5 years compare with what the Soviets could do in absence of the SALT agreement?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. I don’t see any difference between the two myself?

Senator JACKSON. It is virtually the same.

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Virtually the same. In fact, to deploy 313 such missiles in 5 years would be to exceed somewhat the rate of deployment of heavy ICBM’s to date. Again, though, I think we really have to expect maximum Soviet effort in the next few years to be in the modernization and improvement of existing forces toward a counterforce capability. They have sufficient force levels to afford that capability and we need now only improvements in those forms.

Senator JACKSON. The fact is that the introduction of MIRV into the Soviet force will require a very large retrofitting program. That alone will take up a large portion of their resources in this area alone. As you testified earlier, this is the more probable course they would follow, even without a SALT agreement; isn’t that correct?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. I agree, sir; I see nothing in the current agreements that would make me change my expectations of the Soviet activities over the next 5 years, or the development of the threat—unless, of course, it is in what we have and will deny to ourselves.

Senator JACKSON. How does a deployment, of 60 heavy ICBM’s per year compare with the history of the deployment of the SS-9 force?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Sixty per year is, if we consider that the SS-9 deployment began around 1964, and looking only at SS-9 deployment, a somewhat greater pace. Looking at all ICBM deployment, SS-11’s and 13’s along with SS-9a, it is less than the peak ICBM deployment pace.

**UPGRADING OF SOVIET FORCES**

Senator JACKSON. Is it correct that an aggressive Soviet program of qualitative upgrading in which they were to replace SS-9 missiles with a follow-on, and SS-11’s with a follow-on, could absorb virtually the entire Soviet ICBM production capability as we have seen that capability demonstrated in the past?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. I should certainly imagine it would.

Senator JACKSON. Do you agree with the statement that the interim agreement halts the momentum of the Soviet ICBM program over the next 5 years?
Dr. VAN CLEAVE. I do not and if one takes the February defense reports expression of what constitutes greater concern, I think it would support that statement.

Senator JACKSON. Based on the statement of the Department of Defense itself?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE: That’s right.

Senator JACKSON. In October 1970, I asked Ambassador Smith what options would be open to the United States if the Soviets, without adding to their land-based missile force, improved qualitatively so that it threatened the survival of Minuteman. Ambassador Smith replied as follows, and I quote:

You can harden to a certain extent: you can under the present proposal put in as many as 250 large missiles of any sort you like under any conditions of hardening you like. You can also become less vulnerable by switching to some form of seaborne missile system.

In view of the fact that the right to deploy credible hard point defense was given up some time ago and we later gave up the right to deploy 250 large, hardened missiles or to deploy a seaborne missile system, or by unilateral declaration, to deploy land mobile ICBM’s, how are we to defend the Minuteman force from an upgraded Soviet offensive force?

VULNERABILITY OF MINUTEMAN

Dr. VAN CLEAVE: If these things are given away, it seems to me that the answer is clearly that we cannot. Certainly we cannot defend the force, and we have apparently by unilateral declaration given up mobility for the duration of the agreement. I am aware that there are options that have been suggested, such as converting the Minuteman force to surface ships, aircraft, things of that nature, which presumably would be allowed by the agreements, although to my knowledge, these have never seriously been considered major options for improving Minuteman survivability.

The question of Minuteman vulnerability, as you well know, can get involved in an inordinate numbers game depending upon the assumptions about the threat and so forth.

What should perhaps bother us more than anything else, I think, here is that having given up the options to defend Minuteman force, and having given up other attractive options for survivability, including the option of mobility by our own unilateral statement—

Senator JACKSON. By going to sea, for example?
Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Even giving up going to sea in terms of substituting more submarines and SLBM’s for some Minuteman.

Senator JACKSON. We have given that up.

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Yes, sir.

**DISABLING ALTERNATIVES**

What we should be very concerned about, therefore, is that we may find ourselves faced 5 years from now with an increased upgraded Soviet offensive force and very little alternative to launch on warning, which is not a desirable policy. Yet that seems to be the trend—giving up the survivability options.

Senator JACKSON. That would hardly be stabilizing, would it?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. I would think people should be very concerned about that eventuality.

Senator JACKSON. The world as a whole ought to be deeply concerned that having given up means by which we can defend Minuteman—the ABM or the flexibility of moving some of that force to sea—our remaining option is a destabilizing one. Certainly, it should not be reassuring to people who say they are deeply concerned about the danger of accidental nuclear war. Launch-on-warning is one of the most destabilizing things one could imagine, isn’t it?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. It is certainly inconsistent with the President’s repeated requests for flexibility of forces and for strategic options.

Senator JACKSON. I take it, then, that you are deeply concerned at the prospect, in the 1975-77 period, of a vulnerable Minuteman?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Yes, I am.

Senator JACKSON. Do you have any proposals that you would like to outline in connection with SALT II that might be useful in reducing the vulnerability of the Minuteman force?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. I have no well thought out SALT II proposals on this. One of the major reasons is that it is now going to be very difficult to come up with any realistic proposal to reduce the threat to the survivability of forces by a follow-up SALT agreement. A MIRV ban is unrealistic, and coupled with what it would do to the effectiveness and adequacy of surviving forces would not do it anyway. We are either going to have to build up or convince them to come down. I don’t know how we are going to convince them to come down, to
reduce the threat to our forces that they have built, particularly since all of their activities are looking as if they are pointed in the direction of a counterforce capability. It seems to me that we are left with a large measure of wishful thinking if we expect SALT II to solve such problems.

It would seem to me we have to put our attention now on whatever we can do to insure the necessary survivability and flexibility ourselves, including rethinking our attitudes about defense and about assured destruction.

Senator JACKSON. When you talk about counterforce, you are talking about a first-strike capability?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Yes, sir; in the connection of a Soviet threat to the survivability of our forces.

Senator JACKSON. I think it is important for the public record, Dr. Van Cleave, that you expand on precisely that point.

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. What I am concerned about here is not counterforce capabilities per se. I would like to see counterforce capabilities emphasized more for the United States. They are essential to any flexibility.

What I am concerned about is the Soviets having a significant—even though perhaps partially disarming—first-strike counterforce capability.

**IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET FIRST-STRIKE CAPABILITY**

Many people now begin to appreciate the political implications of apparent first-strike disarming capability on the part of the Soviet Union. Not enough people, I think, yet recognize the possibility of the military implications of having this type of situation and yet I think it is clearly what we are going to be faced with.

If we look back at the way our strategy of assured destruction was developed, it was essentially based on a very simple model, which was that the Soviet Union would launch a strike at the United States and the only thing we had to be concerned about was that we had a sufficient force surviving to retaliate and inflict unacceptable urban and population damage in the Soviet Union. The very simple model presumed that essentially all Soviet forces would be launched in point of time before all of our response, that we would be free to retaliate and that the threat of this retaliation would rest not only on capability but also on its credibility. If we now get into a situation where a Soviet first disarming strike could be conducted with a fraction of Soviet strategic forces, with a large Soviet assured destruction force held in
reserve, then our assured destruction retaliatory capability doesn’t seem to me to be very credible.

What we have then is not a situation of retaliation with a free ride. With only a reduced assured destruction force remaining, the United States is left in a position of being the initiator of a countercity war at a time when that is the last thing I should think we would want to do.

Senator JACKSON. Could you sketch out a scenario that would cover what you have been discussing? I think it is a very important point.

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Even if U.S. calculations show that surviving U.S. forces would retain some magic assured destruction capability, 20 to 25 percent of Soviet population, or whatever, the question now is more one of whether it is credible that the United States would so respond with the reduced force and only call down on itself retaliatory destruction.

The President himself has said that he has to have other options than that. The situation here is that the land-based retaliatory forces, if they are not survivable, may well be vulnerable to a Soviet counterforce-only strike with a small fraction of the Soviet strategic forces, perhaps as low as one-fourth, maybe even one-fifth depending upon what they do in MIRV’s and accuracy and so forth. The question is, would we use our surviving force to Soviet industrial urban complexes when we would be faced at the time with a Soviet residual assured destruction force far greater than our own. It is the threat of that type of situation that may make us feel very, very insecure during the mid-1970’s period and the later years of the 1970’s and the spectre of that type of scenario cannot help but have the most profound political implications for our Government, our foreign relations, and Soviet behavior.

Senator JACKSON. As far as our diplomacy is concerned?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. As far as anything we do in any confrontation or contest with the Soviet Union and as far as what any of our allies or any of the other nations in the world do when they are choosing how to conduct their own foreign and defense policy.

Senator JACKSON. In other words, let us suppose that, between now and 1977, the Soviets develop the capability to knock out Minuteman and our land-based bomber force, leaving us with whatever Polaris boats happened to be on station. I take it that it is your judgment that this remaining force is hardly a credible deterrent for an American President in dealing with the Soviet Union, especially since the Soviets would have their SS-11’s and Y-boats in reserve, a force which could knock out all of our cities and certainly all human life in North America.

In your judgment, that is hardly a credible deterrent, is that right?
Dr. VAN CLEAVE. I should think that would be a wholly unsatisfactory situation and yet that is one I see us heading toward.

Senator JACKSON. That is what you foresee unless some very strong measures are taken?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. That's right.

Senator JACKSON. This could well be the kind of situation we could find ourselves in by the end of 5 years or even before, is that what you're saying?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. That's right, particularly with the Soviet Union having a 62-boat force of Y-class submarines with an overwhelming retaliatory capability.

You recall the 1969 Safeguard debates really presented the threat only in terms of the SS-9. The SS-11 was never at that time expected to figure the problem of Soviet counterforce capabilities and yet according to testimony by the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, now we have the spectre of an accurate SS-11 force which may even have multiple reentry vehicles, and that means it is not any longer solely a counter urban-industrial force if it ever was.

Senator JACKSON. So that in the time frame that we are talking about here, we have to recognize the fact that unless strong measures are taken, the Soviets could be in a position to knock out Minuteman and or land-based bombers?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. That's right.

**SOVIET RISK-TAKING**

Senator JACKSON. In your judgment, when the Soviets know they have this capability, and they know we don't have the means to provide for the survivability of our own land-based strategic forces, what impact will this knowledge have on Soviet diplomatic, military, and political behavior in the world?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. I would expect to be faced with a Soviet Union that is much more adventuresome and willing to take risks than anything that we have had in the past.

Senator JACKSON. The level of Soviet risk-taking will go up?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. The level of risk-taking will go up considerably.
Senator JACKSON. When the Soviets faced a confrontation with the United States in Cuba in October of 1962, as I recall, we had about a 7 to 1 strategic advantage over the Soviets. Isn’t that correct?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Thereabout, I would say, in intercontinental force.

Senator JACKSON. Nevertheless, one would say that Cuba involved a high level of risk taking on Moscows part, since they were trying to sneak missiles into Cuba in order to tilt the strategic balance. Isn’t that correct?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Yes, sir.

Senator JACKSON. What you are saying, then, is that even when the Soviets were in a nuclear inferior position, they nevertheless took risks which were considered dangerous both to the cause of peace and to our vital national security interests.

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. That’s right.

Senator JACKSON. Would you say that their risk-taking and their intransigence, and their toughness in negotiations during confrontations are all going to increase?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. I would say that. I would say that we had a difficult enough time checking the Soviet Union and extending strategic deterrence to allies when we had a 5 to 1 superiority. I can’t imagine what it is going to be like with the situation that these agreements seem to freeze.

Senator JACKSON. Dr. Van Cleave, it is said over and over again we have enough nuclear warheads to kill everyone in the world five times over. This is the standard response that is made when one talks about the need to improve our strategic forces qualitatively and quantitatively.

Some of these people say there are over 7,000 nuclear warheads in Europe alone, and that is enough, by itself, to deter the Soviets. I would appreciate having your comments on this so-called “overkill doctrine.”

“OVERKILL” FALLACY

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. The “overkill doctrine” was developed several years ago on a very simple proposition that numbers of nuclear warheads could be compared with the amount of population in urban centers and if there were more than enough warheads to kill a number of undefended Soviet cities we had overkill. No strategic considerations were involved and the U.S. apparently struck first. The crux of the matter, however, is that the United States has
a very clear second strike doctrine, and the number of surviving warheads is the important consideration; it is not the number of warheads we have now. Indeed, the number of warheads we have now is almost irrelevant to this type of consideration; it is the number of warheads we expect to survive. We deploy forces to deter, to promote stability, and hopefully to be effective if deterrence fails. We don’t know how many warheads it takes to deter—nobody knows that—but what we do know is that 7,000 tactical nuclear warheads in Europe, if that is what there is would be considerably reduced by any expected serious Soviet first strike in Europe, and the same thing with the strategic forces. In both cases our concern is with the surviving forces and the credibility of their employment. Moreover, while we might put 16 missiles on one Poseidon boat with 10 warheads each and count that as 160 warheads, it might look to the other side as one aim point.

Senator JACKSON. But an adversary who strikes first has a tremendous advantage; isn’t that true?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. I am concerned about the capability to reduce my force levels and force effectiveness and I can’t determine that capability by comparing numbers of warheads. I can look at his capability, including the combination of warheads, accuracy and payload, and I can look at the vulnerability of my systems. That is the strategically relevant thing.

Senator JACKSON. We have to ask not only how many warheads we will have left after a first strike but also how many effective delivery vehicles we will have left after a first strike.

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. And not only that, what can I expect to do with them. If I base deterrence solely on the threat of counter city retaliation, the simple fact that this might be a convenient tool for an analyst to evaluate strategic forces doesn’t mean the President of the United States is going to want to conduct military operations according to that standard. So I have to know what I have left, what the effectiveness of the delivery vehicles might be, what the probability of penetration is and what range of targets I can attack.

SOVIET ABM SYSTEM

Senator JACKSON. Do you believe that, in the absence of a SALT Agreement, the Soviets would have deployed a nationwide ABM system?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. In the absence of a SALT agreement?

Senator JACKSON. Yes; in this time period.

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. In this time period?

Senator JACKSON. Five years.
Dr. VAN CLEAVE. No; I certainly don't think so in that time period, not an active deployed nationwide system—I don’t see how they could. Although I do believe that the Soviets are more interested in defense than we are and I doubt that SALT has changed that.

Senator JACKSON. It would be pretty difficult to deploy a nationwide ABM system in the Soviet Union in the next 5 years.

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. On the other hand, the Department of Defense is on record many, many times testifying that the Soviet ABM radar base that currently exists lends itself to at least a thick regional defense in the Moscow area and that certainly is not limited by the agreement.

SOVIET STRATEGIC DOCTRINE

Senator JACKSON. Do you have any reason to believe the Soviets accept a simple doctrine of assured destruction?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. None whatsoever. I know of nothing in their literature, nothing in their doctrine, nothing in their force activities, nothing in the record of the past 2 years that would support that.

Senator JACKSON. The overall strategic capability that they have developed to date would indicate just the reverse—

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. They are not playing the game by our rules; that is pretty clear.

Senator JACKSON. Did any of your discussions in SALT reflect in any way on this particular aspect of strategic doctrine, that is, the Soviet attitude with regard to assured destruction?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. I cannot comment in open hearings on any discussions that actually went on during the strategic arms limitation talks. I could only say generally that I haven’t changed my view on the basis of my participation in them.

Senator JACKSON. Should the President be left with the single option of striking Soviet cities with submarine-launched missiles in the event that the U.S. land-based deterrent is destroyed in a Soviet first strike?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. I think that would be an intolerable situation. The President himself has said that. Further, I wouldn’t expect the President to exercise that option if that were his only option available.
Senator JACKSON. What other options should he have available to him if we are going to have a sound strategic policy?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. It seems to me we have to have the options conducting limited strategic operations, particularly counterforce, and of limiting damage to ourselves in a significant way, and I think we ought to look very seriously again at our position on defense, including civil defense. I think we ought to look very seriously at the capabilities we have for rapid force reprogramming and retargeting and for the ability to conduct timely counterforce operations; and, furthermore, I don’t think that doing that, contrary to existing majority opinion, would create a more destabilizing situation in our strategic relationships with the Soviet Union. It is quite clear to me that is the way they are going. I don’t see that anything they have done in the last 5 years suggests otherwise.

Senator JACKSON. Then you don’t accept the view that Soviet behavior reflects only what we do?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. I think that is an erroneous mechanistic proposition.

Senator JACKSON. The action-reaction model?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. I think one could very clearly make use of that action-reaction on the other way around and have much of the record support that the Soviets take the opportunities that we present to them, not for the purpose of stability in our terms but for their own purposes. We don’t know what the Soviets’ intentions were when they started their strategic force buildup; it may even have been as we expected in the 1960’s, simply to achieve a situation of rough equality with us in numerical indexes, probably because they didn’t expect that we would give them the opportunity to reach strategic superiority; but when it became clear that our declaratory statement of the 1960’s represent our policy, and the opportunity arose that strategic superiority could be gained, the Soviet leaders seized the opportunity.

The same thing goes for a counterforce, first strike. If we indicate clearly we are not going to defend our retaliatory forces, we are not going to take the necessary survivability measures, I think we merely encourage development of a counterforce capability rather than the prevailing concept that our abstinence discouraging it. It doesn’t make any sense to me.

**U.S. STRATEGIC OPTIONS**

Senator JACKSON. Are you satisfied that these agreements leave us in 1977 with adequate forces to enable the President to carry out other options?
Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Not the agreements by themselves. On the other hand, the agreements by themselves do not necessarily preclude all modernization necessary to carry out many options.

Senator JACKSON. Let me put it this way: Do you feel that under the treaty and under the interim agreement we have left to us the means by which we can provide for a credible strategic deterrent?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Well—

Senator JACKSON. I am not saying we will necessarily do it. But given what is permitted in the agreements could we do it if the right decisions are made?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. We have to approach the answer to that by asking deter what? If we mean deterring, for example, attack on allies such as NATO by the threat of U.S. strategic action, I don’t think that deterrent exists any longer and I think the agreement tends to guarantee that it won’t exist and tell the world it won’t exist. This is the nuclear umbrella type of deterrent. If we mean deterring the type of counterforce only attack or types of situations that would arise in a crisis, this depends upon our ability to guarantee that we have no vulnerable tempting forces. The agreements themselves do not do that. They do not promise the situation will not deteriorate. In terms of deterring all-out attacks on the United States, I think there are things we can do even with the agreements and should do that would indeed increase the chances of a credible deterrent against that type of an attack in 1977. It is just a matter of whether or not we are going to do these things or whether we are going to be very complacent about the fact that we have reached strategic arms limitation agreements, whether we are going to continue putting an awful lot of importance on reaching future strategic limitation agreements as the way to solve our strategic problems.

The case can be made, disregarding Safeguard ABM, that the position we are in now is that we are not going to be ready to deploy new programs in the next few years and what we need to do now is to conduct a very vigorous program in research and development especially in those various areas where we have options for survivability of forces and those areas where we could increase force effectiveness and flexibility. I think if we push on those programs during the next 2 or 3 years it is the minimum conditions we have to do in the presence of these agreements.

Senator JACKSON. In other words, to really achieve a survivable force that will be credible in the eyes of the Soviet Union?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. It is the minimum that we can do and, also, it is the only thing that I can see that will at all hold out any hopes for a beneficial follow-on agreement.
Senator JACKSON. Dr. Van Cleave, you are spending the summer in Europe teaching. What have you observed of European reaction to SALT?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Many of the people I have talked to in Europe, and this includes some defense and foreign policy specialists, are quite concerned about the implications of these SALT agreements and what it means for the United States to accept this drastically changed balance. They are very concerned themselves about the implications for Europe, for extended deterrence, very concerned about what indications these may give of the major trends that I noted in my opening remarks.

Senator JACKSON. Especially by the people who have the responsibilities in connection with defense planning?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. By people who work on defense problems. I found that much attention is given not only to the changed strategic balance but also to anything that will give them perception of the way we are regarding the strategic balance, and the decade of the seventies. Many of them tend to look at the agreements this way.

There is wide knowledge of statements by U.S. officials about the changed strategic balance implication. They are quite well aware that Dr. Kissinger has said, for example, that it is a more difficult decision for the President of the United States to risk general nuclear war when the strategic equation is this than it was throughout most of the postwar period, therefore, the possibility of defending other countries with strategic American power is fundamentally changed and no amount of reassurances on our part can change these facts.

**OUTCOME AT SALT II**

Senator JACKSON. Would the present agreements be acceptable as a permanent agreement?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Definitely not. The present agreements, as I said before, may be acceptable as a calculated risk only upon the premise they are indeed interim agreements. In my view, the two agreements themselves don’t even go together.

Senator JACKSON. Do you have any reason to believe the Soviets will be more generous in SALT II than SALT I? If not, what moves on our part would be most effective in getting from SALT II, the kind of permanent arrangement which will provide both sides with survivable strategic forces that will protect their vital national interests?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Personally I am afraid there is not a lot of evidence that one can adduce to reach the conclusion that the Soviet Union will be more malleable in terms of helping us solve our strategic problems in SALT II than the Soviet Union was in SALT I. If there are any prospects of success at all, I think it will come only from a clear demonstration that we are
now going to turn our attention to solving our own strategic force problems, that we are going to push the modernization programs that are consistent with the agreements, push the research and development we are allowed to do, particularly toward survivability and flexibility options. If we don’t push these things strongly—indeed it seems to me, the agreements require a new reinvigoration of R. & D. and force modernization—and make clear the intent of the United States to abrogate both agreements, when required, we will not reach a more beneficial agreement.

Senator JACKSON. You said a moment ago that the two SALT agreements don’t even go together. I wonder if you could elaborate a bit on that point.

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. What I mean by that is simply that with the restrictions on defense, on ABM, in the ABM Treaty, the offensive levels allowed by the agreements are intolerable. With the offensive levels allowed by the agreements, we need a much freer rein on defense. That was always the position of the U.S. Government, to my knowledge, in the past. The levels of defense and the levels of offense had to be linked and the current levels of offense seem to me to be totally intolerable with the restrictions we have put on our defense, particularly when we have given up, as well, other important options for survivability.

CREDIBILITY OF U.S. ABM

Senator JACKSON. On that point, what do you think of the limitation of 100 interceptors at each of the two ABM sites?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Well—

Senator JACKSON. Is that credible?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. I obviously don’t think very much of it at all. On the other hand, I would say it we go ahead and build the structure of radar and other supporting elements, the interceptors themselves can be deployed very, very rapidly. The important thing is the radar support and if we will do it we are allowed quite a bit of development in that area.

Senator JACKSON. But we have always maintained that in connection with our hard point defense, that we need far more than 100 interceptors to have a credible ABM defense at a given site. Isn’t that correct?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Well, 100 interceptors per se is just not strategically significant in site defense or defense of retaliatory forces. About the worst thing one can do is to limit the defense to a particular level, then allow an offensive threat that is greater than that. We have told the Soviet Union or anybody else what margin of forces they need to overcome it.
Senator JACKSON. The public gets the idea that we have two sites now that can help protect our retaliatory capability—the one in North Dakota to defend ICBM’s and the Washington, D.C., site to protect the vital decisionmaking process.

In your judgment are these ABM defense arrangements credible or effective?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. The ABM defense arrangements for the defense of our retaliatory forces are not very effective in a strategic sense. They are important to keep the program alive and to give us operational experience. I think continuation of that program is absolutely necessary if we are going to keep options open in 1975 to 1977 and I believe very strongly we have to keep ABM defense options open for that period.

Senator JACKSON. I was only addressing myself to effectiveness.

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. The effectiveness of 100 Interceptors—

Senator JACKSON. Under the limitations imposed.

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. It isn’t very much as far as ICBM defense goes. It could be significant for the defense of the NCA, particularly if we develop the type of radar capability that we possibly could for the area and deploy new, longer-range and improved interceptor missiles. If we did it right we could get an enormous amount of area coverage in the NCA defense that could be quite significant.

Senator JACKSON. Dr. Van Cleave, we’re in your debt for making this long trip to be here and to offer, I think, some extremely helpful comments. You have the unique advantage of coming from the academic world with a background of real experience in the decisionmaking process in the strategic arms field. This cannot help but aid us in the review and analysis of the testimony that has been offered here in connection with the ABM treaty and the interim agreement. So I want to commend you for your help to the committee by your presence here today, for your very fine statement and for your enlightening responses.

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Thank you, Senator.

Senator JACKSON. Thank you.

The committee will stand adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 11 :20 a.m., the hearing was adjourned, to reconvene subject to the call of the chair.)