



EDITOR'S NOTE

Welcome to Volume 2, Number 4 of the *Journal of Policy & Strategy*—a quarterly, online and peer-reviewed journal. This *Special Issue* is devoted to presenting the results of a year-long study addressing three wholly interconnected issues in a threat environment that is significantly changed from that of the Cold War and immediate post-Cold War eras: trilateral deterrence; contemporary extended deterrence; and the emerging roles for missile defense. These three topics are thoroughly interrelated and a useful analysis of each must take into account their interrelationships. The study results presented in this *Special Issue* address multiple, interrelated pertinent questions: How should the United States conceptualize and plan for strategic deterrence, including identifying force adequacy standards, given a trilateral Great Power context? What are the implications for U.S. extended deterrence strategies of Russia's and China's apparent efforts to expand at the expense of U.S. allies and partners? What are the implications of contemporary deterrence and extended deterrence requirements for missile defense postures? And, how could different plausible U.S. and allied missile defense force postures shape U.S. deterrence and extended deterrence goals/strategies? The three articles in this issue of the *Journal of Policy & Strategy* address these questions and more.

Deterrence in the Emerging Threat Environment. The threat-based nature of deterrence has endured for millennia, but its application as a strategy must adapt to different circumstances. U.S. Cold war approaches to deterrence that were developed primarily to deter a single Great Power nuclear adversary, i.e., the Soviet Union, must now be updated to reflect contemporary realities, particularly including the presence of three great nuclear powers and Russia's and China's revanchist, expansionist goals that Moscow and Beijing say are of existential importance. Both Russia and China are increasingly hostile to the United States, have extensive ongoing nuclear modernization and expansion programs, and seek to overturn the established Western-led world order. They also increasingly appear to be collaborating. These unprecedented realities challenge U.S. freedom of action, undermine the allied confidence in the United States, and call into question the continued credibility of U.S. extended deterrent guarantees. There is a critical need to reassess the requirements for effective deterrence in this trilateral Great Power context.

Alliance Politics in a Multipolar World. With a revanchist, militarized Russia and rise of a comparably revanchist China, the need for and pressure on U.S. extended deterrence goals has increased. NATO allies, once members of the Warsaw Pact or parts of the Soviet Union, now neighbor a revisionist Russia; Taiwan is in unofficial diplomatic limbo and faces an increasingly aggressive China. Just as the U.S. deterrence approach must adapt to differing conditions, so too must U.S. extended deterrence strategies. The great question facing the United States is how to establish approaches to extended deterrence and assurance that adapt to these dynamic threats.

The Benefits of Expanded Homeland Missile Defense. Adversaries increasingly feature missile-based coercive threats as key elements of their "theories of victory." They pursue local advantages in conventional forces and the deterrence of U.S. intervention via threats to U.S. homeland. A question now is: can the United States maintain deterrence and extended deterrence when opponents' "theories of victory" feature missile-based threats to the U.S. homeland, and the U.S. homeland is largely vulnerable to missile attack? Throughout most of the Cold War, the ultimate U.S. policy answer to that question was "Yes," and that strategic defenses undermine the desired deterrence "stability." Past U.S. policy answers to this question must now be reassessed in the light of dramatically different threat and deterrence conditions.

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