



## COMPARING SOVIET, RUSSIAN, AND CHINESE INFLUENCE OPERATIONS

*The remarks below were delivered at a symposium on “Comparing Soviet, Russian, and Chinese Influence Operations” hosted by the National Institute for Public Policy on June 14, 2023. The symposium explored the tactics and effects of influence operations by the Soviet Union, Russia, and China and suggested approaches that can be taken by the U.S. government to counter them. It highlighted the conclusions of a forthcoming Occasional Paper on the subject by John Gentry.*

**David J. Trachtenberg**

***David J. Trachtenberg is Vice President of the National Institute for Public Policy and served as Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from 2017-2019.***

As I noted in the invitation to this webinar, this discussion will highlight the results of a National Institute *Occasional Paper* by John Gentry that looks at the various propaganda and disinformation tactics used by the Soviet Union, Russia, and China to influence Western opinion, particularly in the United States, in ways that serve to cast doubt on the resilience of Western societies and increase sympathy and support for the policies of U.S. adversaries. On Monday, National Institute published an abbreviated version of John’s analysis as an *Information Series*, which is available on our website and titled, “Information Operations against the United States: Defensive Actions are Needed.” I will post a link to the paper in the chat box for those interested.

Foreign influence operations are extensive, and those of great power adversaries directed against the United States are well funded and designed to have long-term effects. Many rely on large communities of their own nationals living or studying abroad to help convey their messaging. China’s so-called “Confucius Institutes” operate at more than 500 universities worldwide, propagating viewpoints sympathetic to the positions taken by the Chinese Communist Party and leadership. While the efforts of the Soviet Union, Russia, and China have exhibited similarities in approach, there have been significant differences in their objectives.

For example, rather than defeat the United States, as the Soviets sought to do, China is focused on co-opting the rest of the world through the use of economic, political, and diplomatic measures, including its “Belt and Road Initiative.” Russia’s propaganda efforts have been widespread; and although its influence abroad is significant in areas of Africa, the Middle East, and elsewhere, its aggression against Ukraine and repeated nuclear threats have arguably impacted, at least partially, the attractiveness of its messaging. Yet the United States is still operating at a disadvantage vis-à-vis Russia when it comes to effectively convincing others of the fallacies in Moscow’s disinformation narratives. Surprisingly, some of Russia’s public posturing regarding its war of aggression against Ukraine is resonating among foreign audiences.

Some Russian tactics appear to be more sophisticated than those used by their Soviet predecessors and, in an age of internet connectivity and social media, the ability to propagate



a falsehood worldwide is relatively easy. As a famous quotation (often misattributed to Mark Twain or Winston Churchill) states, “A lie gets halfway around the world before the truth has a chance to get its pants on.”<sup>1</sup>

Just yesterday, France reportedly uncovered a huge Russian disinformation campaign. According to one account, “The main narratives pushed by the disinformation campaign are the ineffectiveness of sanctions against Russia; the alleged Russophobia of Western states; the supposed predominance of Nazi ideology among Ukrainian officials; and the negative effects of welcoming Ukrainian refugees for European countries.” It was “spreading pro-Russian content; impersonating media... as well as government websites including France’s ministry of European and foreign affairs; creating websites on francophone news with polarizing angles; and coordinating fake accounts to spread the content created...”<sup>2</sup>

Indeed, the influence operations of U.S. adversaries show no signs of slackening—in fact, just the opposite. The question is how best can the United States counter these efforts?

The United States has often been criticized for its poor public diplomacy efforts and its perceived failure to counter effectively the propaganda and disinformation campaigns of its major adversaries. U.S. international broadcasting media like the Voice of America have been riddled with controversy, political intrigue, and confusion over its charter and mission. Similarly, the State Department’s Global Engagement Center has encountered difficulties with respect to funding and programming activities that effectively refute adversary narratives.

Nevertheless, there are a number of actions that the United States can take to counter the effect of adversary influence operations. To maximize the chance of success, these actions should reflect a whole-of-government approach, involving the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, Homeland Security, and other federal entities. A number of recommendations are outlined in the *Occasional Paper* and the *Information Series* that are the subject of this symposium, and which I expect will be a topic of discussion today.

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### **John A. Gentry**

***John A. Gentry is adjunct professor at Georgetown University, a former CIA analyst, and a retired U.S. Army officer.***

Thank you, David. I would like to share a bit about the origins of my “Influence Operations of China, Russia, and the Soviet Union: A Comparison,” mention some of its key points, and extend the conversation a bit by discussing U.S. vulnerabilities to influence operations and

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<sup>1</sup> See Aryssa Damron, “Fact Check: Did Winston Churchill Author This Quote about How Fast Lies Travel?” CheckYourFact.com, available at <https://checkyourfact.com/2019/05/31/fact-check-winston-churchill-lie-halfway-world-truth-pants/>. Also see Niraj Chokshi, “That Wasn’t Mark Twain: How a Misquotation Is Born,” *The New York Times*, April 26, 2017, available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/26/books/famous-misquotations.html>.

<sup>2</sup> Laura Kayali and Clea Caulcutt, “France exposes mega Russian disinformation campaign,” *Politico*, June 13, 2023, available at <https://www.politico.eu/article/france-accuses-russia-of-wide-ranging-disinformation-campaign/>.

what the United States can do about them. I am pleased that some of the sources from which I drew in writing my paper and one of my peer reviewers also are on this panel.

This paper is an expansion of my article, “Belated Success: Soviet Active Measures against the United States,” which was published in *American Intelligence Journal* Vol. 39, Issue 2 (2022). As a long-time intelligence officer, the growing divisions in the United States in recent years seemed to me to be consistent with decades-long Soviet efforts to sow dissension within the United States designed to induce the country to collapse from within. I concluded that Soviet active measures efforts, which rely heavily on disinformation campaigns, do indeed—present tense—account for many of America’s political troubles. The Soviets institutionalized many of their campaign techniques and messages, meaning they are still affecting America long after the demise of the USSR. Because it is clear that China and Russia also have malign intentions vis-a-vis the United States and have run influence operations for years, and because most discussion of them focus on the activities of single states, I decided to compare the three efforts, which share many similarities but have important differences.

Among my conclusions: all three countries had/have large, well-financed programs that seek variously to literally destroy the United States (the Soviets), succeed the United States as the world’s dominant power (China), or help restore the imperial glories of the Soviet Union (Russia). They clearly have had considerable success, keeping enthusiasm high for continuing their expensive efforts.

The three countries provide examples of different techniques that target different audiences. The Soviets aimed to destroy its capitalist enemies and the United States, appealing to Marxists and left-leaning people in the United States to help them. Russia’s President Vladimir Putin aims to split the West to help him push back NATO expansion since the 1990s, a prerequisite for restoration of the Soviet empire; because he recognizes the failings of communism, he also has sought to generate support from some right-wing parties and politicians to produce splits in NATO and the European Union that advance Russian interests. In contrast, China seeks to reshape world institutions in China’s image and eventually replace the United States and the West as the world’s dominant power by winning friends and influencing others, sometimes with aggressive “sharp” power that is coercive but rarely violent.

Technologies have changed dramatically over time, but the goals of attackers have remained fairly constant. The Soviets wrote stories for Western journalists or gave them notes from which to write in their own styles, and they forged documents incriminating targets, often based on actual documents their spies stole. In contrast, Russia and China now use social media, and the Internet generally, and they own print and electronic media in the West overtly, something the Soviets could not do. All use sophisticated psychological persuasion techniques including variants of “reflexive control,” which is designed to convince targets to act in ways that benefit attackers, usually unknowingly.

Russia and China conduct many of their influence operations overtly by buying Western newspapers, sponsoring conferences, and operating large media bureaus in New York City,

for example. China sends ideology-laden students to Western universities as agents of influence. The Russians now hire American public relations firms to lobby Congress.

All three countries have prominently targeted American universities, knowing that universities are especially important educators and influencers of young people who are future generations of national decision-makers. All have been successful—the Soviets and Chinese spectacularly so. Soviet influence became massive and obvious on campuses in the 1960s, when Marxism, with no small help from the KGB, became popular. China’s campaign has been much more overt, featuring cash payments, large numbers of full tuition-paying students, and the establishment of Confucius Institutes, which are influence peddlers and dens of espionage. All of these activities have been acceptable to most university administrators, creating over time large domestic bases of support for foreign influence operators.

The time horizons of the groups are different—and seem to be keys to success. The Soviets aimed for success over “decades.” China initially had a 100-year plan—from success in the civil war of 1949 to 2049. Former Communist Party leader Deng Xiaoping famously advocated a “hide and bide” strategy— “hide capabilities and bide time” until China is ready to make its big move, although current President Xi Jinping has been less patient, generating negative international reactions to China’s recent aggressiveness. Russia has a shorter time horizon, which seemingly is a function of Putin’s impatience. Time seems to be an important element of successful influence operations because slow achievement of goals creates a sense of “creeping normalcy” in which victims do not realize they are under attack until it is too late.

Such successes raise unsettling questions about how to handle U.S. citizens who now are agents of foreign influence, sometimes knowingly but often not, who have constitutional protections of free speech that include calls for revolution if they are not accompanied by overtly violent actions. If influence operations pose growing, existential threats, which I believe they do, must constitutional protections change? If so, how can this be done in ethical and legal ways that are not worse than the influence operations themselves? And how can society ameliorate vulnerabilities to future influence operations, including the continuing effects of now institutionalized successes at American universities and new techniques that may be developed? No U.S. government agency seems fully aware of the threat, let alone has tools to act effectively. As a law enforcement agency, the FBI cannot counter legal influence operations. And it is not clear that the divided American people now trust the U.S. government to accurately identify and effectively fight foreign influence operations. This is a major challenge, which merits serious thinking about how the United States got into the mess it now is in.

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**Olga Bertelsen**

***Olga Bertelsen is Associate Professor of Global Security and Intelligence at Tiffin University and an expert on Russian information operations.***

In his study, which is a comparative analysis of influence operations conducted by the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation, and China, Dr. Gentry offers a well-articulated and multi-layered argument, grounded in his meticulous research and his deep understanding of the history of Russian and Chinese intelligence.

Part of Dr. Gentry's argument is that Soviet influence operations were designed to subvert Western societies and eventually to destroy the Western capitalist system by using a variety of tools. There was a strong ideological component in Soviet operations that were designed to: sow discord among Western political and military elites and diaspora ethnic groups; inflame divisions among Americans and provoke political instability and social unrest in target countries; influence the electoral processes; incite violence and foment revolutions in the countries of the so called collective West; and importantly, these operations known as active measures aimed at shaping historical narratives and discourse consistent with the Soviets' interests and provoking people's distrust of their own governments. The Soviets understood very well that whoever controls the narrative has power, and this power might be projected in time and space.

The long-term design of these operations implied raising a generation of people that would question the foundational values of their own countries, as well as cultural traditions and practices of the lands where they were born. The ultimate goal was to discredit democracy and provoke chaos and political instability in target countries which would help replace government and political systems with the ones based on Marxian principles and beliefs. Indeed, as Dr. Gentry has argued, the effect of these operations continues to unfold in front of our eyes in the form of Marxian or leftist indoctrination at our universities and certain narratives pushed by the "liberal" press.<sup>3</sup>

Soviet defector Yuri Bezmenov who escaped to the West in 1970 was correct, and Dr. Gentry seems to appreciate Bezmenov's assessment offered in the 1980s. Forty years ago Bezmenov suggested that Soviet active measures were extremely successful, especially in the United States. In his publications and speeches, he emphasized that America had already lost the ideological war, and one could no longer undo the influence of active measures unless the United States immediately and urgently recognized the problem and did something about it.<sup>4</sup>

In its own way, Putin's Russia has been pursuing the goals of the last stage of the Soviet plan to ideologically subvert the West, which certainly solidified the Soviets' success. We, of course, cannot place the blame totally on the Soviets or on the Russians for the process of

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<sup>3</sup> John A. Gentry, *Influence Operations in China, Russia, and the Soviet Union: A Comparison* (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, 2023)/*Occasional Paper* (National Institute for Public Policy), vol. 3, no. 5 (May 2023): v-84.

<sup>4</sup> Tomas Schuman (Yuri Bezmenov), *Love Letter To America*, available at <https://www.economicstvoodoo.com/wp-content/uploads/Yuri-Bezmenov-Love-Letter-To-America.pdf>; Yuri Bezmenov, "Psychological Warfare Subversion & Control of Western Society," *YouTube*, available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5gnpCqsXE8g>.

trivialization of information and disinformation, imposed by Americans on Americans. However, decades of Russian influence on American politics and culture, a process that is especially transparent to those who formerly resided in the Soviet Union and had been exposed to active measures for decades, resulted in the severe departure of American society from democratic norms.<sup>5</sup> It manifests itself in misrepresentation, deletion, and suppression of information inconvenient for those subscribing to Marxian-like views.

The promotion of one view that dominates discourse has become quite noticeable for more and more Americans. The emergence of a discursive formation (Michel Foucault's term) that dominates public space makes people fear to express an alternative point of view, which results in a gradual loss of their analytical perspective. People's unwavering beliefs and convictions nurtured by the Soviet propaganda machine that pounded a single message in their heads for decades, albeit nicely packaged and even intellectualized, thwarted their collective defensive power and curtailed fruitful intellectual exchange with those who express polar opposite views.

Yet I completely agree with Dr. Gentry that among the three entities (the Soviet Union, Russia, and China) the Russian Federation does appear to be the weakest.<sup>6</sup> Cultural realignment under Putin and his aggressive political course disrupted a very subtle process of continuity in the realm of Russian intelligence, a paradox that many did not expect from a person with an intelligence background. In addition, a cult of money and personal prosperity among Russian intelligence officers that Alexander Litvinenko was concerned about and rebelled against, as well as the militarization of Russian society, negatively impacted chekists' professionalism. The international community began to observe slipshod work and the inability of chekists to cover their tracks. In other words, a lack of professionalism and a lack of commitment among chekists, be it a FSB or GRU officer, to hold themselves to a high level of standards and consistency have become quite transparent.

In my view, this trend emerged because of the general cynicism and pragmatism of Russian society exacerbated by the double standards and duplicity of its political "elites" (elites are in name only; their individual histories suggest that they, with few exceptions, should be characterized as bloodthirsty gangsters). This trend has been remarkably displayed by the Russians domestically and in the territories they have occupied in Ukraine since February 2022.

Having said that, we should not underestimate Russia's information warfare in the domain of history. The roots of these practices and Russia's persistent efforts at subverting the West were designed and planted by Soviet intelligence agencies. During the last two decades the Russian secret services have been promoting historical myths and designing disinformation operations aimed at shaping public opinion and people's psyches. The belief has been that this approach would help Russia achieve superiority in all spheres and shape

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<sup>5</sup> The KGB used the term "active measures" for both domestic and foreign subversive operations.

<sup>6</sup> Gentry, *Influence Operations in China, Russia, and the Soviet Union*, 79.

the psychological profile and ideological preferences of its military personnel and population.<sup>7</sup>

The Russian secret services have co-opted scholars, sponsored pro-Russian Western academic centers, NGOs, and think tanks, and created front organizations that spread Russian propaganda and disinformation. One has to systematically attend conferences organized by Slavic professional associations to realize the massive scale of false narratives spread by scholars seduced by Russian money.<sup>8</sup> Russian intelligence agencies have successfully used Russian academics to establish and foster relationships with foreign educational centers and scholars, who more frequently than not have been unaware of the fact that they have been targeted and are communicating with Russian agents of influence. Groomed by the Russian secret services, Western historians have gradually embraced the arguments and talking points emanating from the Kremlin, and have often inadvertently become active participants in Russian covert operations, contributing greatly to the popularity of Russian narratives. They have uncritically repeated these narratives at international conferences and reposted them on social media platforms.<sup>9</sup>

Furthermore, in contrast to the Soviets who preferred to target leftist scholars and politicians, Russia expanded the list of its targets, aiming to shape the views of the political left and political right. One might want to consult with an excellent study by Anton Shekhovtsov on Russian influence on the political right in Europe.<sup>10</sup> Russia appears to be quite successful in buying influence of prominent Western liberal and conservative politicians. Beyond Schroder and Lebedev that Dr. Gentry mentioned, we should keep in mind that a “close and trusting collaboration” has been established between Putin and Henry Kissinger since the early 1990s. Kissinger was Putin’s supporter during Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, and when Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014 and 2022. According to Marcel H. van Herpen, Kissinger “is the ideal lobbyist for the Kremlin, because he abstains from asking annoying questions about democracy and human rights.”<sup>11</sup>

In this context, another Russian agent of influence should be mentioned here who was both a political activist and a scholar—the late Stephen F. Cohen who passed away in 2020. An American scholar of Russian Studies, he justified Putin’s aggressive political course by

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<sup>7</sup> Blagovest Tashev, Michael Purcell, and Brian McLaughlin, “Russia’s Information Warfare: Exploring the Cognitive Dimension,” *MCU Journal* 10 (2019): 129–47 (p. 132); Timothy L. Thomas, “Dialectical versus Empirical Thinking: Ten Key Elements of the Russian Understanding of Information Operations,” *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 11 (1998): 40–62.

<sup>8</sup> On the process of Russian cooptation in Western academia, see Olga Bertelsen, “Russian Front Organizations and Western Academia,” *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, January 13, 2023, available at <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/08850607.2022.2147807>.

<sup>9</sup> Andrew Radin, Alyssa Demus, and Krystyna Marcinek, “Understanding Russian Subversion Patterns, Threats, and Responses,” in *Rand Corporation*, available at [https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE300/PE331/RAND\\_PE331.pdf](https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE300/PE331/RAND_PE331.pdf), p. 14.

<sup>10</sup> Anton Shekhovtsov, *Russia and the Western Far Right: Tango Noir* (London: Routledge, 2017).

<sup>11</sup> Marcel H. van Herpen, “The Strange Putin-Kissinger Friendship,” *Cicero Foundation* (Commentary No. 16/01), January 2016, available at [https://www.cicerofoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/Marcel\\_H\\_Van\\_Herpen\\_The\\_Putin\\_Kissinger\\_Friendship.pdf](https://www.cicerofoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/Marcel_H_Van_Herpen_The_Putin_Kissinger_Friendship.pdf), p. 5.

promoting Putin's narrative about NATO's alleged threat to the Russian Federation.<sup>12</sup> Together with his wife Katrina vanden Heuvel, the publisher, part-owner, and former editor of the magazine *The Nation*, Cohen infamously spread pro-Kremlin narratives. Worse, he sponsored professional associations, sat on editorial boards of numerous peer-reviewed journals, and shaped the doctoral theses and minds of many of his Ph.D. students. These are only a few examples in the sea of Russian influence operations in Western academia. Their scale is massive, and in this context, Dr. Gentry's suggestion seems debatable. In his paper, he wrote:

...there does not seem to have been a systematic Russian effort to re-shape the ideological orientation of Western universities, as the Soviets did, or to court major Western institutions as broadly as China does, although pro-Russian persons surely appear overtly at Western academic conferences.<sup>13</sup>

Nevertheless, I agree with Dr. Gentry that Chinese operations in American academia, and more broadly, among Western intellectual and political elites, are more substantial, given the fact that the Chinese diaspora and exchange students are legally obliged to serve the Chinese government and its secret services. The sheer numbers of educational exchange programs and Chinese students in the United States alone, cultural diplomacy, and oral and written disinformation distributed through these channels surpass the Russian efforts.

Another point that I would like to stress concerns fears and paranoia that the Soviet Union, Russia, and China have displayed. Dr. Gentry has aptly noted that all three countries presented themselves as victims of Western conspiracies and the West's militant posture. I would argue that for Putin this narrative serves merely as a cover for and a justification of his neo-imperial aspirations and actions, so we should not take his talking points for granted. There is no fear or paranoia there, when the Russians identify the Ukrainians as fascists and NATO as an aggressive and militant alliance. These narratives simply served Putin as a shield and a rationale he offered to the international community for a full-fledged invasion of Ukraine.

In terms of the scope of Russian target priorities, which according to Dr. Gentry, are somewhat *narrower* than Chinese, I would suggest some other term in this context: Russian priorities are rather *flexible*, and they depend exclusively on the internal political dynamics in the United States. A weak political leadership in the United States inspires Putin to expand the geography, the scale, and the intensity of his operations; a strong political leadership in the United States sends a strong message to Putin to hold his horses. And he does, or at least he did in the past.

Another extremely interesting and important aspect of active measures that Dr. Gentry briefly discussed in his paper is about how the Soviets (and today the Russians) financed/finance their influence operations.<sup>14</sup> Indeed, the KGB began to hide funds before

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<sup>12</sup> See the Munk Debates of two teams, Stephen Cohen and Vladimir Pozner Jr. vs Garry Kasparov and Anne Applebaum, "The West vs Russia," *YouTube*, October 14, 2017, available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XPomKoLW8cU>.

<sup>13</sup> Gentry, *Influence Operations in China, Russia, and the Soviet Union*, p. 51.

<sup>14</sup> Gentry, *Influence Operations in China, Russia, and the Soviet Union*, p. 28.



*perestroika* in the early 1980s, investing them abroad in front organizations and various NGOs. What is less known is that the KGB funds were combined with the party money that were partially utilized to finance influence operations. The Russian FSB and the GRU still use these funds for their influence operations abroad because the interest on the billions of dollars earned over the decades is mindboggling. Those Russians who tried to trace the KGB and party money all died under mysterious circumstances. Among them was Yulian Semenov, a Soviet and Russian writer, and Artiom Borovik, a Russian investigative journalist and media magnate.<sup>15</sup> By the way, the latter was also a vocal critic of Putin. In Borovik's last publication he quoted Putin who said: "There are three ways to influence people: blackmail, vodka, and the threat to kill."<sup>16</sup> So despite the fact that Russia has been less sophisticated and professional than its predecessor there is a significant continuity between the Soviet and Russian approaches to influence operations, which are generously financed and seem to have a serious impact on the West that goes along with narratives promoted by Soviet and Russian intelligence.

In conclusion, Dr. Gentry is correct suggesting that in light of the scale of Chinese and Russian influence operations, countering them is an urgent task. The United States experiences an existential crisis that seems to deepen rather rapidly. As Jaroslaw Martyniuk, the author of the *Monte Rosa: Memoir of an Accidental Spy*, has suggested, "much of the harm is self-inflicted, but a good part is due to hostile outside players such as Russia and China sowing discord."<sup>17</sup> A week ago (6-7 June 2023), the second meeting of the Counterterrorism Law Enforcement Forum was hosted in Oslo by the U.S. Departments of State and Justice and the Government of Norway. The State Department Deputy Coordinator for Counterterrorism Ian Moss emphasized Russia's damaging role in promoting false narratives about Nazi Ukraine, and announced that the Bureau of Counterterrorism is awarding \$2 million "for new projects designed to counter Russian disinformation and publicize Russia's hypocrisy on this front."<sup>18</sup> This is a wonderful initiative, yet it is a very modest investment, considering the scale of Russian influence/disinformation operations and the facts offered in Dr. Gentry's article.

There should be efforts on national and global levels to mitigate the negative effects of Chinese and Russian influence campaigns, but the first step--recognizing the problem—is the most difficult from an epistemological perspective. As Bezmenov suggested, for an ideologically subverted nation, it is a great challenge to change its perspective and begin to question its own views and beliefs.

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<sup>15</sup> On Borovik's and Semenov's interactions, see Vladimir Solov'iov, *Zapiski Skorpiona: Roman s pamiat'iu* (Moskva: Ripol Klassik, 2007), pp. 253-256.

<sup>16</sup> Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Business Watch, "Oleg Kalugin: 'Man in the News Once Again,'" April 9, 2002. Also, Yuri Felshtinsky and Vladimir Pribylovsky, *The Age of Assassins: The Rise and Rise of Vladimir Putin*, London: Gibson Square Books, 2008), pp. 116-121.

<sup>17</sup> Jaroslaw Martyniuk, "What Do Russia, Antifa and Black Lives Matter Have in Common?," *The Ukrainian Weekly*, June 26, 2020, available at <https://www.ukrweekly.com/uwwp/what-do-russia-antifa-and-black-lives-matter-have-in-common/>.

<sup>18</sup> "Second Meeting of the Counterterrorism Law Enforcement Forum," *U.S. Department of State*, June 7, 2023, available at <https://www.state.gov/second-meeting-of-the-counterterrorism-law-enforcement-forum/>.