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### **No First Use: Threatening Alliance Cohesion, Assurance, and Non-Proliferation**

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#### **Introduction**

The U.S. extended nuclear deterrent is underpinned by the deterrent threat option to escalate to nuclear first use in the event of otherwise unstoppable aggression against an ally. For decades, major allies have testified as to the critical importance they attach to this nuclear escalation threat behind the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent. It is a key reason, allies insist, that they are able to stand back from pursuing their own national possession of nuclear weapons—and thus a key to U.S. nuclear non-proliferation goals. It is no overstatement to conclude that, for decades, the U.S. extended deterrent, including the nuclear escalation option, have been essential to the cohesion of U.S. alliances and the relative success of nuclear non-proliferation.<sup>1</sup>

Episodic U.S. initiatives to move to no first use (NFU) or “sole purpose” nuclear weapon policies—that would preclude U.S. nuclear employment in response to anything other than an opponent’s nuclear attack—would directly contradict the traditional U.S. extended nuclear deterrent commitment to allies. These initiatives are a prime example of how the U.S. pursuit



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of arms control goals can unintentionally undermine the keys to alliance cohesion—extended nuclear deterrence and the assurance of allies. U.S. allies have consistently expressed sharp, substantive opposition to U.S. proposals for an NFU or “sole purpose” nuclear policy—two different titles for essentially the same policy constraint on U.S. deterrent strategies, i.e., precluding a U.S. nuclear response to an opponent’s non-nuclear attack, including an opponent’s chemical or biological weapons (CBW) attack.<sup>2</sup>

Despite this consistent, enduring allied opposition and a deteriorating national security environment, recent U.S. presidential administrations continue to signal their enthusiasm for an NFU or “sole purpose” policy in an effort to showcase their commitment to reducing the number and role of nuclear weapons. For example, coincident with Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s most recent three-day visit in China, Assistant Secretary of State Mallory Stewart reportedly declared with seeming enthusiasm that the United States “is open to considering a proposal by China that nuclear weapons states negotiate a treaty on the no-first use (NFU) of nuclear weapons.”<sup>3</sup> This renewed signaling by the Biden Administration of interest in NFU is only the latest in Washington’s expressions of interest in an NFU policy, and will likely again be followed by strong allied pushback. This cycle has been repeated numerous times over the past five decades. As a recent academic study of the subject rightly concluded, “The question of whether the United States should adopt an NFU pledge has arisen repeatedly in debates of declaratory policy and is likely to recur...”<sup>4</sup>

Various administrations’ efforts to move toward an NFU policy in contradiction of the U.S. nuclear umbrella for allies typically have been supported by some members of Congress who have proposed laws articulating their own version of the NFU or “sole purpose” policy.<sup>5</sup> Washington’s continuing initiatives to adopt such an arms control policy that allies expressly and repeatedly oppose, based on their serious and understandable concerns about its degrading effect on the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrent, contribute to growing allied questioning of U.S. credibility as a guarantor of their security.

Ironically, perhaps, Washington’s numerous arms control forays toward an NFU policy contribute to allied doubts about extended deterrence and undermine U.S. efforts to assure allies regarding their security position. In short, Washington’s repeated moves in the direction of an NFU policy fan allied fears about U.S. extended deterrence credibility that, in turn, undermine U.S. efforts to sustain allied cohesion and non-proliferation goals. Rather than recognizing this problem and finally curtailing its initiatives to advance an NFU policy, or spending the enormous resources needed to provide a plausible alternative to the traditional U.S. nuclear escalation threat backstopping extended deterrence, Washington continually disturbs allies with its repeated NFU forays—only to stand back following equally-repeated allied pushback.

### **Allied Opposition to NFU**

Allied opposition to NFU and “sole purpose” policies is based largely on understandable fears that, at a time of increasing regional threats to their security, U.S. adoption of such policies



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would undermine the credibility of extended nuclear deterrence.<sup>6</sup> This fear is almost certain to be accurate in plausible circumstances.<sup>7</sup> Yet, U.S. administrations have repeatedly expressed interest in implementing NFU or “sole purpose” policies—raising questions among allies about U.S. intentions and the continuing credibility of the U.S. extended deterrent—and thus undermining needed alliance cohesion and expanding the potential for nuclear proliferation. By continuing to pursue NFU or “sole purpose” policies despite consistent allied objections, Washington contributes to allied uncertainty regarding the U.S. commitment to extended deterrence and to their security, and thereby contributes to the very allied doubts and associated proliferation problem Washington seeks to avoid in the first place.

Washington should keep in mind the guidance that former Defense Secretaries William Perry and James Schlesinger offered pertaining to allied concerns regarding U.S. nuclear policy choices. Secretary Schlesinger advised: “It is important for us to pay attention to their [allied] concern and not to judge whether deterrence is effective by our standards, but we have to take their standards into account as well.”<sup>8</sup> Secretary Perry went on to argue that “the failure to do this, as suggested by Dr. Schlesinger, the failure to do this will be that those nations will feel that they have to provide their own deterrence—in other words, they will have to provide their own nuclear weapons. So that will lead to a failure of [non]proliferation.”<sup>9</sup>

Alliance dissolution and the consequent likely cascade of nuclear proliferation would be a major blow to U.S. national security and non-proliferation goals. Yet, by periodically floating NFU policies that are anathema to allied perceptions of extended deterrence and assurance requirements, Washington continues to fan the prospects for alliance dissolution and a cascade of nuclear proliferation. This ongoing problem is wholly avoidable if only Washington would recognize the implications this arms control aspiration holds for extended deterrence credibility—and its corresponding potential effect on alliance cohesion and proliferation incentives.

### **NFU or “Sole Purpose” in the First Obama Administration**

In 2009, President Obama famously emphasized America’s commitment to nuclear disarmament,<sup>10</sup> stating that Washington would take “concrete steps towards a world without nuclear weapons” and reduce “the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy.”<sup>11</sup> As one of these steps, the Obama Administration reportedly considered adopting an NFU or “sole purpose” declaratory policy during the lead-up to its 2010 *Nuclear Posture Review Report* (NPR), and again toward the end of the Administration’s second term.

Ultimately, the 2010 NPR itself effectively avoided an NFU policy by rejecting the proposition “that deterring nuclear attack is the sole purpose of nuclear weapons.”<sup>12</sup> This carefully-crafted language left open the possibility of U.S. nuclear escalation in some scenarios of an otherwise unstoppable attack on allies. However, foreshadowing subsequent U.S. initiatives toward an NFU policy, the 2010 NPR also stated that the Administration “will work to establish conditions under which such a policy could be safely adopted.”<sup>13</sup>



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This approach included an advertised strengthening of advanced conventional forces, missile defenses, and regional security architectures, and eliminating chemical and biological weapons.<sup>14</sup> While much of this non-nuclear agenda failed to materialize, the 2010 NPR explicitly recognized the importance of allied concerns regarding NFU when it stated it would “consult with allies and partners regarding the conditions under which it would be prudent to shift to a policy under which deterring nuclear attack is the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons.”<sup>15</sup>

Allied governments’ concerns appear to have played a significant role in the Obama Administration’s ultimate rejection of an NFU policy during its first term.<sup>16</sup> Robert Einhorn, Special Advisor for Nonproliferation and Arms Control at the Department of State, said at a rollout event for the 2010 NPR, “In our discussions with allies and friends around the world – and we had many frequent contacts with those friends – they indicated to us that such a radical shift [sole purpose] in [sic] U.S. approach could be unsettling to them.”<sup>17</sup> Allied concerns with respect to a U.S. NFU declaratory policy were also noted by the 2009 Strategic Posture Commission, which stated that the adoption of such a policy would be “unsettling to some U.S. allies” and that it “would also undermine the potential contributions of nuclear weapons to the deterrence of attack by biological weapons.”<sup>18</sup> Despite changes in allied governments and often-expressed aspirations for global nuclear disarmament – similar to Washington’s own long-declared disarmament aspirations – allied opposition to NFU policies has remained remarkably consistent.

### **The Second Obama Administration**

Toward the end of President Obama’s second term, the Administration reportedly again considered implementing an NFU declaratory policy. A group of Democratic Senators urged President Obama to do so in order “to bolster U.S. national security and advance the [nuclear disarmament] commitment” the President made in Prague in 2009.<sup>19</sup> The idea again had significant support within Washington’s usual disarmament community that had been disappointed by President Obama’s rejection of NFU and “sole purpose” in his first term.<sup>20</sup>

By the end of President Obama’s second term, however, it was blatantly clear that the Administration’s attempted “reset” with Russia had come to naught as Moscow invaded yet another country, this time Ukraine, in 2014. The invasion was Russia’s second in six years (Russia invaded Georgia in 2008) and reflected the worsening security environment that made NFU policies less likely to gain traction in Washington and even more anathema to key allies. China’s revisionist ambitions also became clearer and some experts warned that the PRC would interpret a U.S. NFU declaration “as a sign of US military decline” that would embolden Beijing’s leadership to pursue its “dream of supplanting the United States as the world’s superpower.”<sup>21</sup>

It is, therefore, unsurprising that the Obama Administration’s reconsideration of NFU, yet again, ran into opposition from U.S. allies and reportedly prompted several of them, including Japan, South Korea, France and the United Kingdom, to lobby the Administration against the



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change in policy.<sup>22</sup> A senior government official close to Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe called an adoption of NFU “unacceptable” from the standpoint of Japan’s security.<sup>23</sup> While nuclear disarmament advocate Joe Cirincione mocked these allies as “nervous nellies,” as if they did not understand their own security requirements,<sup>24</sup> the Obama Administration’s apparent renewed interest in an NFU declaration was again not supported by many experts and policy-makers in allied countries and the United States.

For example, the Administration’s renewed NFU foray reportedly was opposed by several high-level cabinet officials, including the then Secretaries of Defense, Energy, and State.<sup>25</sup> Then Secretary of the Air Force Deborah Lee James also publicly expressed concerns about the policy, and several other high-level military officials rejected it.<sup>26</sup> Then Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command Cecil Haney and then Commander of the U.S. Air Force Global Strike Command Robin Rand also spoke against NFU, given an international threat environment that had become more complex and dangerous.<sup>27</sup>

Allies reportedly first learned about the Administration’s reconsideration of an NFU declaratory policy from the news, which, if true, indicates an inadequacy in Washington’s communications on the subject, despite the 2010 NPR’s explicit commitment to improving communications with allies.<sup>28</sup> Japan, under a new government since President Obama’s first term, and South Korea, expressed strong opposition to a U.S. NFU nuclear weapons declaratory policy and “would likely have deep concerns about a sole purpose commitment.”<sup>29</sup>

Despite this repeated allied expression of opposition to NFU, and the Obama Administration’s second retreat from it, in January 2017, then Vice President Joseph Biden again indicated continuing enthusiasm for an NFU policy, stating that he believed the administration had “made enough progress that deterring—and if necessary, retaliating against—a nuclear attack should be the *sole purpose* of the U.S. nuclear arsenal.”<sup>30</sup> While the Obama Administration had ultimately again decided against significant changes in the U.S. declaratory policy, the Biden Administration subsequently returned to the cause. The cycle of Washington advancing the policy and allies opposing it continued yet again—suggesting Washington’s seeming imperviousness to recognizing the associated alliance, extended deterrence, and proliferation problems.

### **NFU, “Sole Purpose,” and the Biden Administration**

Despite enduring allied opposition, presidential candidate Biden continued to support an NFU nuclear declaratory policy during his 2020 campaign. In 2019, two prominent Democrats, the House Armed Services Committee Chairman Adam Smith and Senator Elizabeth Warren, a Senate Armed Services Committee member, introduced a “No First Use Act,” which would have legally prohibited the United States from employing nuclear weapons first in a conflict.<sup>31</sup> The bill did not make it into law but it was an indication that an NFU or “sole purpose” policy would become a prominent part of the 2020 Democratic Party platform.

President Biden’s team members spoke in favor of an NFU or “sole purpose” declaratory policy prior to joining the administration, including then-nominated (and later confirmed)



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Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security.<sup>32</sup> President Biden himself reiterated his belief that “*the sole purpose* of the U.S. nuclear arsenal should be deterring – and, if necessary, retaliating against – a nuclear attack.”<sup>33</sup> He said he would “work to put that belief into practice, in consultation with the U.S. military and U.S. allies.”

During the preparation of the 2022 NPR, the Biden Administration reportedly sent a questionnaire to allies asking for their views regarding U.S. adoption of “sole purpose” and “NFU” policies.<sup>34</sup> Allied responses apparently (again) were overwhelmingly negative, including from the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, and Australia.<sup>35</sup> As noted, successive Japanese governments have opposed U.S. initiatives to adopt such declaratory policies.<sup>36</sup>

Indeed, there is a long-running Japanese government position in favor of keeping the nuclear escalation option open for extended deterrence purposes, despite the Japanese public’s apparent opposition to nuclear weapons.<sup>37</sup> Tokyo’s opposition to an NFU or “sole purpose” policy appears largely to be based on fear that the adoption of such policy would weaken deterrence.<sup>38</sup> The Japanese Defense Ministry’s 2023 *White Paper* argues that the international community “has entered into a new era of crisis” not seen since the Second World War.<sup>39</sup> Given the dangerous trends in Japan’s neighborhood, particularly including the Russian, Chinese, and North Korean promotion of nuclear capabilities and threats, successive Japanese governments *have rejected calls* for the United States to adopt an NFU or “sole purpose” declaratory policy, even if they occasionally expressed an interest in reviewing the policy.<sup>40</sup>

Discussing the issue of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent, an Australian expert noted that when “doubts have arisen about US commitments in the past, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and even Australia have toyed with their own nuclear weapons programs,” and that there “is no reason to assume they will not do so again.”<sup>41</sup> Jüri Luik, Estonia’s permanent representative to NATO, publicly commented that in Estonia’s opinion, the present nuclear posture should be maintained, i.e., the United States should continue to reject NFU or “sole purpose.”<sup>42</sup> Ben Wallace, then British Secretary of State for Defence, spoke out specifically against changes in U.S. declaratory nuclear policy toward NFU and “sole purpose.”<sup>43</sup>

Again, following serious allied pushback, the Biden Administration stepped back from an NFU or “sole purpose” policy in its 2022 NPR, despite endorsement in the 2020 party platform. Negative allied and public responses appear to have contributed to the Administration’s foregoing NFU or “sole purpose.” Nevertheless, and undoubtedly to allied distress and consternation, the 2022 NPR identified a “sole purpose” policy as a continuing U.S. goal,<sup>44</sup> an ongoing aspiration that has indeed been manifest in recent Administration statements on the subject.

This continuing cycle of Washington’s expressed desire to adopt an NFU policy to advance an arms control agenda despite strong, repeated allied opposition is evidence of Washington’s seemingly obtuse unwillingness to acknowledge the incompatibility of NFU with a U.S. extended nuclear deterrence policy that key allies deem crucial for their security and for non-proliferation goals. Allies repeatedly express their concerns about the need to *reinforce* credible



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extended deterrence in the contemporary threat context while offices in Washington continue to promote an NFU policy. The friction between expressed U.S. aspirations in this regard and allied opposition to those aspirations reflects a continuing profound difference in Washington's and allied understandings of the role of nuclear weapons in extended deterrence and assurance requirements.

Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and its subsequent repeated brandishing of nuclear threats bear further bad news for proponents of NFU or "sole purpose" declaratory policies, and arms control in general.<sup>45</sup> In fact, among publics in some NATO countries and in South Korea, there has been a marked shift in favor of hosting U.S. nuclear capabilities on their territory since Russia's unjustified invasion escalated.<sup>46</sup>

### Conclusion

For decades, Washington has episodically and seriously considered the adoption of NFU or "sole purpose," but on each occasion ultimately did not do so. This cyclical back and forth may be seen as exemplary of U.S. deference to allied concerns. From an allied perspective, however, it can only be disturbing that the same policy battle with Washington must repeatedly be fought to stem an initiative that so obviously is contrary to the need for credible extended deterrence and allied assurance—an initiative that continues to be a stated U.S. policy aspiration. This ongoing cycle understandably contributes to skepticism regarding the future of extended deterrence and compels allies to consider their options if they are unsuccessful the next time this familiar cycle reemerges—particularly if in a harsh threat environment. Those options potentially include distancing from Washington and conciliation to powerful foes, or independent acquisition of national nuclear capabilities: either such development would cause rifts in U.S.-allied relations; together they could unravel the global alliance system critical to American security.

<sup>1</sup> Japan, for example, is in a tough neighborhood with nuclear-armed North Korea, China, and Russia, and relies on the U.S. extended deterrent, "with nuclear deterrence at its core." Ministry of Defense, *National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2019 and Beyond*, December 18, 2018, Provisional Translation, p. 8, available at [https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2019/pdf/20181218\\_e.pdf](https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2019/pdf/20181218_e.pdf).

<sup>2</sup> See the discussion in, Matthew Costlow, *A Net Assessment of "No First Use" and "Sole Purpose" Nuclear Policies*, *Occasional Paper*, Vol. 1, No. 7 (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, July 2021), available at <https://nipp.org/papers/a-net-assessment-of-no-first-use-and-sole-purpose-nuclear-policies/>.

<sup>3</sup> Reported in, Daniel Schoolenberg, "Is the U.S. Finally Taking China's NFU Seriously? The U.S. is open to considering a proposal by China that nuclear weapons states negotiate a treaty on the no-first use (NFU) of nuclear weapons," *The Diplomat Online*, April 27, 2024, available at <https://thediplomat.com/2024/04/is-the-us-finally-taking-chinas-nfu-seriously/>.

<sup>4</sup> Caitlin Talmadge, Lisa Michelini, and Vipin Narang, "When Actions Speak Louder Than Words," *International Security*, Vol. 48, No. 4 (Spring 2024), p. 44.



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<sup>5</sup> Joe Gould, “Warren, Smith introduce bill to bar US from using nuclear weapons first,” *Defense News*, January 30, 2019, available at <https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2019/01/30/warren-smith-introduce-bill-to-bar-us-from-using-nuclear-weapons-first/>.

<sup>6</sup> Sayuri Romei, “Japan and the Nuclear Challenge in a New Era of Rising Tensions,” *Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 2, Issue 3 (Fall 2019), pp. 70-71, available at

[https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/JIPA/journals/Volume-02\\_Issue-3/04-Romei.pdf](https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/JIPA/journals/Volume-02_Issue-3/04-Romei.pdf).

<sup>7</sup> See Franklin C. Miller and Keith B. Payne, “The dangers of no-first-use,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, August 22, 2016, available at <https://thebulletin.org/2016/08/the-dangers-of-no-first-use/>; and, Keith Payne, “Once Again: Why ‘No-First-Use’ is a Bad Idea,” *Information Series*, National Institute for Public Policy, No. 408, July 5, 2016, available at [https://nipp.org/information\\_series/payne-keith-b-once-again-why-a-no-first-use-policy-is-a-bad-very-bad-idea-information-series-no-408/](https://nipp.org/information_series/payne-keith-b-once-again-why-a-no-first-use-policy-is-a-bad-very-bad-idea-information-series-no-408/).

<sup>8</sup> See, Hearing before the House Armed Services Committee on *Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States*, U.S. House of Representatives, 111<sup>th</sup> Congress (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, May 6, 2009), available at <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-111hrg53569/html/CHRG-111hrg53569.htm>.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>10</sup> Office of the White House, “Remarks By President Barack Obama In Prague As Delivered,” April 5, 2009, available at <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-delivered>.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>12</sup> Department of Defense, *Nuclear Posture Review Report*, April 2010, pp. viii, 16, available at [https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/NPR/2010\\_Nuclear\\_Posture\\_Review\\_Report.pdf](https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/NPR/2010_Nuclear_Posture_Review_Report.pdf).

<sup>13</sup> Department of Defense, *Nuclear Posture Review Report*, op. cit., p. 16.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 17, 47.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.* p. 48.

<sup>16</sup> Brad Roberts, “Debating Nuclear No-first-use, Again,” *Survival*, Vol. 61, No. 3 (June-July 2019), p. 43, available at <https://cgsr.llnl.gov/content/assets/docs/Debating-Nuclear-No-first-use-Again.pdf>.

<sup>17</sup> Robert J. Einhorn, as quoted in, “DoD’s Nuclear Posture Review Rollout Briefing,” *Defense.gov*, April 7, 2010, available at [https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/NPR/FPC\\_4-7-10\\_Nuclear\\_Posture\\_Review.pdf](https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/NPR/FPC_4-7-10_Nuclear_Posture_Review.pdf).

<sup>18</sup> United States Institute for Peace, *America’s Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States*, 2009, p. 36, available at [https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/America's\\_Strategic\\_Posture\\_Auth\\_Ed.pdf](https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/America's_Strategic_Posture_Auth_Ed.pdf).

<sup>19</sup> *Letter to President Barack Obama*, U.S. Senate, July 20, 2016, available at [https://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/\\_cache/files/9/6/96cf16f8-2e75-4a6d-a71d-b7ebd7404296/39888086CF8EC760E72A410351FE05C6.letter-to-president-obama-on-nuclear-weapons.pdf](https://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/9/6/96cf16f8-2e75-4a6d-a71d-b7ebd7404296/39888086CF8EC760E72A410351FE05C6.letter-to-president-obama-on-nuclear-weapons.pdf).

<sup>20</sup> Roberts, op. cit., p. 45.

<sup>21</sup> Parris Chang, “No-first use would only embolden China,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, September 21, 2016, available at [https://thebulletin.org/roundtable\\_entry/no-first-use-would-only-embolden-china/](https://thebulletin.org/roundtable_entry/no-first-use-would-only-embolden-china/).

<sup>22</sup> Josh Rogin, “U.S. allies unite to block Obama’s nuclear ‘legacy,’” *The Washington Post*, August 14, 2016, available at [https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/allies-unite-to-block-an-obama-legacy/2016/08/14/cdb8d8e4-60b9-11e6-8e45-477372e89d78\\_story.html?utm\\_term=.c0e0d6c4d694](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/allies-unite-to-block-an-obama-legacy/2016/08/14/cdb8d8e4-60b9-11e6-8e45-477372e89d78_story.html?utm_term=.c0e0d6c4d694).

<sup>23</sup> “Japan seeks talks with U.S. over ‘no first use’ nuclear policy change,” *The Japan Times*, July 15, 2016, available at <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/07/15/national/japan-seeks-talks-u-s-no-first-use-nuclear-policy-change/>.

<sup>24</sup> Rogin, op. cit.





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<sup>25</sup> Paul Sonne, Gordon Lubold, and Carol Lee, “‘No First Use’ Nuclear Policy Proposal Assailed by U.S. Cabinet Officials, Allies,” *The Washington Post*, August 12, 2016, available at <https://www.wsj.com/articles/no-first-use-nuclear-policyproposal-assailed-by-u-s-cabinet-officials-allies-1471042014>.

<sup>26</sup> Aaron Mehta, “US Air Force Secretary Skeptical of No-First-Use Nuclear Policy,” *Defense News*, August 3, 2016, available at <https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2016/08/03/us-air-force-secretary-skeptical-of-no-first-use-nuclear-policy/>; and, Bill Gertz, “Military Warns Against Nuclear Policy Change,” *The Washington Free Beacon*, July 15, 2016, available at <https://freebeacon.com/national-security/military-warns-nuclear-policy-change/>.

<sup>27</sup> Gertz, op. cit.

<sup>28</sup> Rogin, op. cit.

<sup>29</sup> Richard C. Bush and Jonathan D. Pollack, “Before moving to ‘no first use,’ think about Northeast Asia,” *The Brookings Institution*, July 20, 2016, available at <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/07/20/before-moving-to-no-first-use-think-about-northeast-asia/>.

<sup>30</sup> Office of the White House, “Remarks by the Vice President on Nuclear Security,” January 12, 2017, available at <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/12/remarks-vice-president-nuclear-security>. (Emphasis added)

<sup>31</sup> Gould, “Warren, Smith introduce bill to bar US from using nuclear weapons first,” op. cit.

<sup>32</sup> Bryan Bender, “‘This is going to be quite a show’: Biden’s arms control team eyes nuclear policy overhaul,” *Politico*, January 27, 2021, available at <https://www.politico.com/news/2021/01/27/biden-nuclear-weapons-policy-463335>.

<sup>33</sup> Joseph Biden, “Why America Must Lead Again,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 99, No. 2 (March/April 2020), available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-01-23/why-america-must-lead-again>. (Emphasis added).

<sup>34</sup> Demetri Sevastopulo and Henry Foy, “Allies lobby Biden to prevent shift to ‘no first use’ of nuclear arms,” *Financial Times*, October 29, 2021, available at <https://www.ft.com/content/8b96a60a-759b-4972-ae89-c8ffbb36878e>.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

<sup>36</sup> Nobuyasu Abe, “No First Use: How to Overcome Japan’s Great Divide,” *Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2018), p. 137, available at <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epdf/10.1080/25751654.2018.1456042?needAccess=true&role=button>.

<sup>37</sup> Sayuri Romei, “The legacy of Shinzo Abe: a Japan divided about nuclear weapons,” August 24, 2022, available at <https://thebulletin.org/2022/08/the-legacy-of-shinzo-abe-a-japan-divided-about-nuclear-weapons/>.

<sup>38</sup> Romei, “Japan and the Nuclear Challenge in a New Era of Rising Tensions,” op. cit., pp. 70-71.

<sup>39</sup> Ministry of Defense, Japan, *Defense 2023*, 2023, p. 230, available at [https://www.mod.go.jp/en/publ/w\\_paper/wp2023/DOJ2023\\_EN\\_Full.pdf](https://www.mod.go.jp/en/publ/w_paper/wp2023/DOJ2023_EN_Full.pdf).

<sup>40</sup> Abe, op. cit. p. 37.

<sup>41</sup> Andrew O’Neil, “A ‘No-First-Use’ doctrine would undermine American nuclear deterrence,” *The Interpreter*, January 21, 2021, available at <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/no-first-use-doctrine-would-undermine-american-nuclear-deterrence>.

<sup>42</sup> Joe Gould, “Estonia’s envoy to NATO talks Russia, Afghanistan and US nuclear policy,” *Defense News*, November 24, 2021, available at <https://www.defensenews.com/global/2021/11/24/estonias-envoy-to-nato-on-the-russia-crisis-us-nuclear-policy-and-afghanistan-pullout/>.

<sup>43</sup> Ben Wallace, *Web Event at the American Enterprise Institute*, July 13, 2021, available at <https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/210713-UK-Secretary-of-State-for-Defence-Ben-Wallace-discusses-strategic-priorities.pdf?x91208>.



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<sup>44</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, *2022 Nuclear Posture Review* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2022), p. 9, available at <https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF>.

<sup>45</sup> Michaela Dodge, "What Do Russia's Nuclear Threats Tell Us About Arms Control Prospects?," *Information Series* No. 564 (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, October 2, 2023), available at [https://nipp.org/information\\_series/michaela-dodge-what-do-russias-nuclear-threats-tell-us-about-arms-control-prospects-no-564-october-2-2023/](https://nipp.org/information_series/michaela-dodge-what-do-russias-nuclear-threats-tell-us-about-arms-control-prospects-no-564-october-2-2023/).

<sup>46</sup> Michal Onderco, Michal Smetana, and Tom Etienne, "Hawks in the making? European public views on nuclear weapons post-Ukraine," *Global Policy*, January 5, 2023, available at <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/1758-5899.13179>.

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