



INFORMATION SERIES

Issue No. 592

July 10, 2024

Macron's European Union Nuclear Deterrence Initiative and Extended Nuclear Deterrence

Dr. Mark Schneider

Dr. Schneider is a Senior Analyst with the National Institute for Public Policy. Before his retirement from the Department of Defense Senior Executive Service, Dr. Schneider served as Principal Director for Forces Policy, Principal Director for Strategic Defense, Space and Verification Policy, Director for Strategic Arms Control Policy and Representative of the Secretary of Defense to the Nuclear Arms Control Implementation Commission. He also served in the senior Foreign Service as a Member of the State Department Policy Planning Staff.

In a speech at the Sorbonne in April 2024, French President Emmanuel Macron: 1) noted that Europe is threatened by Russia and that it “can die”; 2) called for an open debate on the role of nuclear weapons in European security; and, 3) proposed the idea of a European Union nuclear deterrent based upon the French nuclear deterrent.¹ It has been suggested that this was an election ploy. However, elements of the Macron speech reflect French policy going back many decades. Indeed, his speech was very close to what he said in 2017.² In response to a similar Macron speech in 2020, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg dismissed his call to put France’s nuclear deterrent at the center of European defense strategy, saying the United States, France and Britain already “provide an effective security umbrella.”³ Other elements of the 2024 Macron speech are relatively new, reflecting a belated French realization of the malevolence and danger of Putin’s imperialism.

French policy with regard to the Russian threat changed drastically after the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the announced Russian nuclear alert, its large February 2022 nuclear exercise, and Russia’s frequent nuclear war threats.⁴ In response to these Russian actions, France, for the first time since 1981, deployed more than one of its nuclear ballistic



INFORMATION SERIES

Issue No. 592 | July 10, 2024

missile submarines to sea at one time – indeed, three submarines.⁵ France even put its nuclear-capable aircraft carrier under NATO command.⁶

Current French policy on nuclear weapons can be traced to the presidency of Charles de Gaulle who was impacted by his World War II experience; he believed he and France were not treated with sufficient deference by the Allies. President de Gaulle even adopted what was called an “all-azimuth” nuclear targeting strategy under which the United States was regarded as a potential enemy.⁷ This view was never taken seriously in France and the formulation evolved into “without any azimuth.”⁸ This was a significant change from the original “Atlanticist” rationale for the French nuclear deterrent in which nuclear weapons were seen as a mechanism for France to have more clout in the NATO alliance.⁹

In 1959, President de Gaulle evicted all U.S. military forces from France including a large U.S. Air Force contingent with great nuclear potential, effectively reducing the possibility of NATO defending against Soviet attack with conventional weapons. This may have been the intended impact because President de Gaulle did not believe that conventional defense against the Soviet hordes was possible. In 1966, President de Gaulle pulled France out of NATO’s unified military command.¹⁰ For decades France has not participated in NATO’s nuclear planning.

President de Gaulle spoke differently in private. He told President Eisenhower that, “The Soviets know me. They know that if I have the strike force to respond to an invasion of Western Europe, I will use it, and that will be an additional deterrent for them.”¹¹ He is also reported to have said that the French nuclear force would automatically protect NATO, “Much better than the American force! For the simple reason that we are European, while the Americans are not. The interest of the Americans in not allowing Europe to be destroyed is tiny compared to ours. If Europe is invaded, we are toast.”¹² One can see a strong echo of de Gaulle’s approach in Macron’s emphasis on the need for European control of the decision for nuclear weapons first use.

President de Gaulle’s idea may have been that France could force the United States to defend Europe with nuclear weapons by launching nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union which would precipitate nuclear strikes against the United States which would then force the United States to introduce nuclear weapons earlier than it desired in order to better control nuclear escalation.¹³

France, which had experienced defeat in the Second World War and the horrendous occupation by Nazi Germany, is determined to never be invaded again. The French nuclear deterrent appears to have worked. Since the end of the Cold War, the Warsaw Pact war plan has been made public. The 1964 Warsaw Pact war plan (before France had achieved a significant nuclear deterrent) sought to capture Lyon (a major city in Eastern France) on day nine of the attack.¹⁴ The late Warsaw Pact war plan, in a timeframe in which France had obtained substantial nuclear capability, ended its advance at the Rhine (the French border). Under this war plan, there were no planned nuclear strikes against France and the United Kingdom, the two European nuclear powers.¹⁵ By the late 1980s, both had achieved significant nuclear capability.



INFORMATION SERIES

Issue No. 592 | July 10, 2024

It has sometimes been suggested that the combined French and U.K. nuclear capability could be the basis for a European nuclear deterrent. The United Kingdom, which was heavily bombed by Germany during the blitz and late in the war by the V-1 and V-2 missiles, also believes that nuclear deterrence is critical to its security. Indeed, in March 2024, the U.K.'s Defense Ministry published an important report on its nuclear weapons which declared that the U.K. nuclear deterrent was a "national endeavour." It noted that, "Nuclear risks are rising. Having illegally invaded Ukraine and broken its former commitments, Russia is trying to use reckless nuclear rhetoric to stop others from sending help. China is rapidly increasing its warhead numbers and expanding its range of delivery systems."¹⁶

Regarding the feasibility of Macron's proposed EU nuclear deterrent based upon the French nuclear force (Britain is no longer a member of the EU), it is noteworthy that France has substantially reduced its nuclear deterrent compared to what existed in the late Cold War period. France has: 1) eliminated all of its land-based nuclear missiles, 2) cut a ballistic missile submarine, reducing to one the routine number of French submarines survivable at sea, 3) reduced French alert nuclear forces (both the number of "weapon systems on alert and the response time"), and 4) limited its nuclear forces to under 300 warheads, reaffirmed in 2020 by President Macron.¹⁷


The United Kingdom dramatically cut its number of nuclear warheads from an announced Cold War peak of 540,¹⁸ and reduced to a single submarine system armed with the U.S. Trident missile.¹⁹ Even before Putin's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the United Kingdom had identified Russia as its most important threat and increased its nuclear arsenal. The last announced self-imposed U.K. nuclear warhead limit was up to 260, an increase in response to Russian aggression, which had festered since Russia's 2014 seizure of Crimea and *de facto* military seizure of two provinces in Eastern Ukraine. The 260 warhead limit was described as "...a ceiling not a target and is not the UK's current stockpile."²⁰ The U.K.'s Defense Ministry has stated that, "Since 1992, the UK has given up: the nuclear Lance missile and artillery roles we undertook previously with US nuclear weapons held under dual-key arrangements; our maritime tactical nuclear capability, so that Royal Navy surface ships no longer have any capability to carry or deploy nuclear weapons; and all of our air-launched nuclear weapons."²¹

The Alliance-wide requirements for extended nuclear deterrence either by the United States, the United Kingdom or France is an important and complex issue that will not be discussed here. Suffice it to say, it likely requires a nuclear force significantly more diverse and capable than what is necessary to deter an attack on an individual, modest-sized nation like Britain or France.

Russia clearly has the largest and most diverse nuclear arsenal in the world.²² Russian nuclear forces dwarf those of France or even Britain and France combined. Figure 1 below, produced by NATO, indicates the scope of the difference between French and U.K nuclear forces and those of Russia:²³



Figure 1: Comparing Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons Arsenal



ICBM: Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile
SLBM: Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile

Note: Russia often has multiple varieties of the same type of weapon, and does not disclose all its nuclear weapons systems, meaning that some may not be listed here.

Source: Jens Stoltenberg, *The Secretary General's Annual Report*, 2020



INFORMATION SERIES

Issue No. 592 | July 10, 2024

The disparity in non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons is the greatest. The French ASMP and ASMP-A supersonic cruise missiles are capable but their number is small and it is not known for certain whether France has low-yield nuclear weapons. Noted French international security expert Bruno Tertrais has written that, “The option of exploding only the first-stage primary may have been exploited, since it is known to be an easy adaptation from a technical point of view.”²⁴ In addition, French SLBM warheads have recently been reported to have variable yields.²⁵ An absence of French low-yield nuclear weapons could be a significant problem for extended deterrence of a Russian low-yield nuclear attack. As then-Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter stated in 2016 “...it’s a sobering fact that the most likely use of nuclear weapons is not the massive nuclear exchange of the classic Cold War-type, but rather the unwise resort to smaller but still unprecedentedly terrible attacks, for example, by Russia or North Korea to try to coerce a conventionally superior opponent to back off or abandon an ally during a crisis.”²⁶

Compared to UK and U.S. assessments, Macron’s Sorbonne speech was much more Gaullist. The China threat is minimized except in the economic context. According to Macron:

The United States of America has two priorities. America first, which is legitimate, and China. Europe is not a geopolitical priority in the coming years and decades, no matter how strong our alliance and how fortunate we are to have an administration that is very committed to the Ukrainian conflict. And so, yes, the days of Europe buying its energy and fertilizers from Russia, outsourcing to China and relying on the US for security are over.²⁷

The “America first” priority which Macron refers to as “legitimate” is not that of former President Trump, but Washington’s more traditional, globalist notion of national interest. And, President Macron does not even mention the strongest argument in favor of his proposal, the U.S. de-emphasis on nuclear deterrence since the end of the Cold War.

The Biden Administration’s 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, as weak as it was on nuclear deterrence, probably does not fully reflect the White House’s thinking because of the influence of the U.S. military on the report.²⁸ A much more accurate indication of the Biden Administration’s reasoning is its consistent refusal to enhance the U.S. nuclear deterrent capability or credibility, or to enhance the survivability of U.S. nuclear forces, despite near weekly Russian nuclear threats during the current Ukrainian war.²⁹ Instead of improving nuclear deterrence as many in Congress are urging, Mr. Sullivan said “...we’re investing in cutting-edge non-nuclear capabilities that will help sustain our military advantage for decades to come. Capabilities like conventionally-armed hypersonic missiles that can reach heavily-defended, high-value targets – in contrast to the nuclear-capable missiles of similar kind that Russia and China are developing.”³⁰ This conclusion appears to be based on a fundamental misunderstanding about the relative power and military effectiveness of nuclear and conventional weapons. Moreover, Mr. Sullivan does not take into account the vast number of Chinese ballistic and hypersonic missiles.



INFORMATION SERIES

Issue No. 592 | July 10, 2024

Mr. Sullivan even said, "...capabilities like new space and cyberspace tools ... will help the United States retain its advantage across every domain."³¹ These capabilities are very important but they have little or no relevance to deterring or responding to a nuclear attack. Thousands of cyber-attacks happen every day.³² Russia is one of the leading perpetrators.³³ To compare their significance to a nuclear attack is amazing. There are no American nuclear or conventional offensive or defensive weapons deployed in space and the United States is not developing them.³⁴ Significantly, President Biden has banned the testing of U.S. anti-satellite weapons.³⁵

In President Biden, the free world has a weak leader. Former Director of Central Intelligence and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has stated that, "I think he has been wrong on nearly every major foreign policy and national security issue over the past four decades."³⁶ What this means for nuclear deterrence cannot be prudently ignored. Former Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev has written that Putin and the Russian elite believe that President Biden is "mentally inept" and that the European Union is "toothless."³⁷ These perceptions are the likely motivations for President Macron's proposal of a European Union nuclear deterrent based on French nuclear forces.

President Biden supports Ukraine, but has no vision of how victory can be achieved or how the war can be ended. He demands restraints on Ukrainian use of American weapons that may facilitate a Russian victory.³⁸ Putin is willing to accept very high costs to achieve victory and territorial expansion. Indeed, former Russian diplomat Boris Bondarev believes that Putin would be willing to lose "10 or 20 million soldiers" to win the war with Ukraine.³⁹ As Piotr Smolar writing in *LeMonde* noted, "*By seeking to avoid escalation without ever imposing the conditions for a resolution, the United States has lost credibility.*"⁴⁰ (Emphasis in the original).

In the West's current crisis situation, any reasonable proposal for enhanced nuclear deterrence should be examined. However, President Macron's proposals are inconsistent. On one hand, he proposes reducing tensions with Russia. On the other hand, he suggests sending troops to Ukraine. In his April 2024 Sorbonne speech, President Macron states, "Of course, the European pillar within NATO that we are in the process of building ... is essential."⁴¹ Yet, his basic proposal is linked to the belief the NATO-based regime is seriously inadequate. President Macron proposes a completely new deterrent system based upon the European Union. However, he ignores the inadequacy of the European Union governmental structure which lacks an elected President, creating a command structure that is problematic, particularly with regard to any future nuclear command and control for an autonomous European deterrent.

President Macron has certainly gotten Russia's attention. The Russian Foreign Ministry's May 2024 nuclear threat against NATO singled out Macron with particular venom. It stated:

We regard the statements made by President of France Emmanuel Macron about the possibility of sending French and other NATO troops to Ukraine as completely irresponsible and careless. Moreover, the Western media have reported that a number of mercenaries from the French Foreign Legion are already in Ukraine. This can only be regarded as evidence of the readiness and intent to enter into direct confrontation



INFORMATION SERIES

Issue No. 592 | July 10, 2024

with Russia, which would amount to a head-on military clash between nuclear powers. We have taken note of a number of France's actions, including military exercises and other activities, which are likely designed to fortify Macron's statements with the demonstration of Paris's nuclear capability.⁴²

In light of Russia's aggressively expansionist foreign policy,⁴³ getting Moscow's attention in this way probably is a good thing since it reflects Russia's fear of the possible consequences of its reckless behavior. Despite the bravado from Moscow, except in nuclear weapons, Russia is relatively weak, not in self-defense but in implementing Putin's agenda of neo-fascist expansion against Europe.

There are some aspects of the Macron Sorbonne speech that are worthy of consideration. For example, he points out that Europe "...has forgotten to take responsibility for and [to] protect its external borders – not as impenetrable fortresses, but as boundaries between the inside and the outside. There can be no sovereignty without borders."⁴⁴ This fundamental truth is obvious to Macron but lost on the Biden White House. President Macron also noted that, "Between 1993 and 2022, gross domestic product per capita in the United States rose by almost 60%. Europe's has grown by less than 30%."⁴⁵ Thus, even the "America Last" economy that Trump is campaigning to invigorate has provided more than twice the economic growth of "socialist" Europe. This truth is ignored not only by the Biden White House but by America's leftwing establishment.

President Macron's call for a credible European defense is certainly important. However, what he believes to be credible is dubious. President Macron stated, "We also need to press ahead with implementing the Strategic Compass, which we concluded under the French Presidency of the Council of the European Union, and in particular to set up a rapid reaction force to be able to deploy up to 5,000 military personnel in hostile environments by 2025, particularly to come to the aid of our citizens."⁴⁶ This is hardly going to impress Russia. This program is anemic even by NATO standards. The NATO Response Force High Readiness Joint Task Force is about 20,000 strong.⁴⁷ Beyond that, NATO has placed, "300,000 troops on higher readiness, backed by substantial air and naval power."⁴⁸ Arguably, even this is an inadequate deterrent vis-à-vis the prompt attack threat Russia will likely pose – particularly after the end of its war against Ukraine.

In addition to the small size of the existing French nuclear force, France before Macron (and to a lesser extent President Jacques Chirac) was reticent in making any *firm* commitment to extending nuclear deterrence over other states. In this regard, the British commitment to extended nuclear deterrence appears more credible than that of France. Historic French security policy exploited the reality that Russia must defeat NATO before it can threaten France with invasion. The credibility of Macron's proposal is further reduced by the lack of any indication that France will make any increase in its nuclear capability.

Thus, from the standpoint of enhancing European security, President Macron's proposal is flawed. However, it should not be completely dismissed in light of President Biden's demonstrated inability to function as President and leader of NATO. His flawed national



INFORMATION SERIES

Issue No. 592 | July 10, 2024

security policies include: 1) allowing the Taliban to take over Afghanistan and taking no military action to rescue threatened Americans; 2) reducing the planned U.S. nuclear deterrent modernization in the midst of a brutal Russian invasion of Ukraine and constant high level Russian nuclear threats; 3) eliminating “hedging” against uncertainties as a requirement for U.S. nuclear policy; 4) reducing the real level of defense spending and cutting defense procurement in the worst crisis period since the 1930s; 5) opening U.S. borders with its great impact on welfare costs, crime and likely domestic terrorism; 6) increasing the national debt one trillion dollars every 100 days with catastrophic consequences for the U.S. economy and national power; 7) seeking to prevent Israel from destroying Hamas including cutting off military assistance to its war effort; 8) seeking to prevent Israel from retaliating against an Iranian attack involving over 300 missiles and drones; and 9) planning for the *de facto* importation of a large number of Hamas terrorists into the United States in the name of humanitarianism. These are hardly policies designed to inspire confidence in Washington’s decision making and extended deterrence credibility.

Recently, Putin said that a 2024 Biden election victory (a man he routinely threatens with nuclear war) is better for Russia.⁴⁹ Biden’s chaotic and tentative defense and foreign policies clearly are a reason Putin expects to gain effective coercive leverage from Moscow’s threats of nuclear escalation.⁵⁰ Russia’s theory of victory is based on the belief that Russia’s first use of nuclear weapons will panic the West and the United States will not retaliate.⁵¹ President Biden’s national security policies hardly inspire confidence anywhere that President Putin will believe that the United States will retaliate in-kind against a Russian nuclear attack, particularly if it is relatively small and directed against a U.S. ally. It is only in this harsh context that Macron’s problematic proposal for a European nuclear deterrent based on French forces warrants any consideration and may gain traction.

¹ “Emmanuel Macron: Europe – It Can Die. A New Paradigm at The Sorbonne,” *Geopolitique.eu*, April 26, 2024, available at <https://geopolitique.eu/en/2024/04/26/macron-europe-it-can-die-a-new-paradigm-at-the-sorbonne/>.

² Gerardf Araud, “‘Our Europe is mortal. It can die.’ Decoding Macron’s Sorbonne speech,” *Atlanticcouncil.org*, April 29, 2024, available at <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/our-europe-is-mortal-it-can-die-decoding-macrons-sorbonne-speech/>.

³ “NATO Chief Rejects Macron Call To Put French Nukes At Center Of European Strategy,” *RFE/RL*, February 16, 2020, available at <https://www.rferl.org/a/nato-soltenberg-dismisses-macron-call-french-nuclear-deterrence/30436632.html>.

⁴ Mark B. Schneider, “Russian Use of Nuclear Coercion against NATO and Ukraine,” National Institute for Public Policy, *Information Series* No. 521, May 2, 2022, available at https://nipp.org/information_series/mark-b-schneider-russian-use-of-nuclear-coercion-against-nato-and-ukraine-no-521-may-2-2022/.

⁵ “France Triples Sea-Based Deterrent Patrols,” *Warships International Fleet Review*, May 2022, p. 7.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ Bruno Tertrais, “French Nuclear Deterrence Policy, Forces, And Future: A Handbook,” *Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique*, February 2020, p. 26, available at



INFORMATION SERIES

Issue No. 592 | July 10, 2024

<https://www.frstrategie.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/recherches-et-documents/2020/202004.pdf>.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid., p. 39.

¹⁰ “1967: De Gaulle pulls France out of NATO’s integrated military structure,” NATO, March 3, 2009, available at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_139272.htm.

¹¹ Tertrais, “French Nuclear Deterrence Policy, Forces, And Future: A Handbook,” op. cit., p. 40.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ “Taking Lyon on the Ninth Day? The 1964 Warsaw Pact Plan for a Nuclear, Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pac, (PHP),” May 2000, available https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/108642/warplan_dossier.pdf.

¹⁵ Kyle Mizokami, “Revealed: How the Warsaw Pact Planned to Win World War Three in Europe,” *The National Interest*, July 2, 2016, available at <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/revealed-how-the-warsaw-pact-planned-win-world-war-three-16822>.

¹⁶ “Delivering the UK’s Nuclear Deterrent as a National Endeavour,” U.K. Ministry of Defense, March 2024, p. 4, available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6622702b49d7b8813ba7e576/Defence_Nuclear_Enterprise_Command_Paper_v6.pdf.

¹⁷ “Speech of the President of the Republic on the Defense and Deterrence Strategy,” *Elysee*, February 7, 2020, available at <https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2020/02/07/speech-of-the-president-of-the-republic-on-the-defense-and-deterrence-strategy>: Bruno Tertrais, “The Last To Disarm? The Future of France’s Nuclear Weapons,” *Nonproliferation Review*, Vol. 14, No. 2, July 2007, available at https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/npr/npr_200707/npr142_tertrais.pdf.

¹⁸ “The hidden threat: how serious is the nuclear arsenal of Britain and France,” *VPK News*, February 26, 2024, available at https://vpk.name/en/830642_the-hidden-threat-how-serious-is-the-nuclear-arsenal-of-britain-and-france.html.

¹⁹ Claire Mills, “Nuclear Weapons at a Glance: United Kingdom,” House of Commons Library, May 3, 2023, p. 4, available at <https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-9077/CBP-9077.pdf>.

²⁰ “The 2021 Integrated Review: nuclear frequently asked questions,” U.K. Ministry of Defense, April 27, 2021, available at <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/the-2021-integrated-review-nuclear-frequently-asked-questions>.

²¹ Ibid.

²² “Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” Office of the Director of National Intelligence, February 5, 2024, p. 16, available at <https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2024-Unclassified-Report.pdf>.

²³ Jens Stoltenberg, *The Secretary General’s Annual Report, 2020* (Brussels, BE: NATO, 2021), p. 32, available at https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2021/3/pdf/sgar20-en.pdf.

²⁴ Tertrais, “The Last to Disarm? The Future of France’s Nuclear Weapons,” op. cit., p. 256.

²⁵ “The French Nuclear Deterrent,” House of Commons Library Briefing Paper, No 2079, November 20, 2020, available at <https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN04079/SN04079.pdf>.



INFORMATION SERIES

Issue No. 592 | July 10, 2024

²⁶ Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, “Remarks by Secretary Carter to troops at Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota,” U.S. Department of Defense, September 26, 2016, available at <https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/956079/remarks-by-secretary-carter-to-troops-at-minot-air-force-base-north-dakota/>.

²⁷ “Emmanuel Macron: Europe – It Can Die. A New Paradigm at The Sorbonne,” op. cit.

²⁸ U.S. Department of Defense, *2022 Nuclear Posture Review* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2022), available at <https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF>.

²⁹ Mark B. Schneider, “Dealing With Vladimir Putin’s Nuclear Crisis – The Case for Maximum Deterrence,” *Real Clear Defense*, November 17, 2022, available at https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2022/11/17/dealing_with_vladimir_putins_nuclear_crisis_the_case_for_maximum_deterrence_865351.html; “U.S. sees ‘no reason to change’ nuclear alert levels at this time -White House,” *Reuters*, February 28, 2022, available at <https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-sees-no-reason-change-nuclear-alert-levels-this-time-white-house-2022-02-28/>.

³⁰ “Remarks by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan for the Arms Control Association (ACA) Annual Forum,” The White House, June 2, 2023, available at <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/06/02/remarks-by-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-for-the-arms-control-association-aca-annual-forum/>.

³¹ Ibid.

³² “Top Cybersecurity Statistics for 2024,” *Cobalt*, December 8, 2023, available at <https://www.cobalt.io/blog/cybersecurity-statistics-2024>.

³³ “Russia Cyber Threat Overview and Advisories,” National Coordinator for Critical Infrastructure and Resilience, no date, available at <https://www.cisa.gov/topics/cyber-threats-and-advisories/advanced-persistent-threats/russia>.

³⁴ Charles Q. Choi, “Pentagon Official: U.S. Is Not Developing Space Weapons.” *Space.com*, February 20, 2009, available at <https://www.space.com/3607-pentagon-official-developing-space-weapons.html>; “Pentagon Leaders Emphasize ‘Responsible’ Options for Countering Space Weapons.” *Air and Space Forces.com*, July 24, 2023, available at <https://www.airandspaceforces.com/pentagon-responsible-options-space-weapons/>.

³⁵ “To Slow an Anti-Satellite Arms Race, White House Bans U.S. Tests of Space Weapons,” *Time.com*, no date, available at <https://time.com/6168148/space-weapons-ban-harris/>.

³⁶ Philip Bump, “Robert Gates Thinks Joe Biden Hasn’t Stopped Being Wrong for 40 Years,” *The Atlantic*, January 20, 2014, available at <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/01/robert-gates-thinks-joe-biden-hasnt-stopped-being-wrong-40-years/356785/>.

³⁷ Justin Huggler, “Vladimir Putin is bluffing over nuclear threat, says Yeltsin minister,” *Telegraph.com*, March 7, 2022, available <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2022/03/07/vladimir-putin-bluffing-nuclear-threat-says-yeltsin-minister/>.

³⁸ Jonathan Sweet and Mark Toth, “Ukraine cannot win if Biden bars attacks on Russian soil,” *The Hill*, June 22, 2023, available at <https://thehill.com/opinion/4060085-ukraine-cannot-win-if-biden-bars-attacks-on-russian-soil/>.

³⁹ Kelly Hayes, “Putin willing to sacrifice ‘20 million’ soldiers to win Ukraine war, ex-Russian diplomat says,” *Fox 13*, October 25, 2022, available a <https://www.fox13seattle.com/news/putin-willing-sacrifice-20-million-soldiers-win-ukraine-war-ex-russian-diplomat>.



INFORMATION SERIES

Issue No. 592 | July 10, 2024

⁴⁰ Piotr Smolar, "Ukraine, Gaza: Joe Biden's foreign policy is mired in contradictions," *Le Monde*, April 20, 2024, available at https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/04/20/ukraine-gaza-joe-biden-s-foreign-policy-is-mired-in-contradictions_6669011_4.html.

⁴¹ "Emmanuel Macron: Europe – It Can Die. A New Paradigm at The Sorbonne," op. cit.

⁴² "Foreign Ministry statement on the Russian Armed Forces' exercises held to practice for the use of non-strategic nuclear weapons," Russian Federation Foreign Ministry, May 6, 2024, available at https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1948486/.

⁴³ Taras Kuzio, "How Putin's Russia embraced fascism while preaching anti-fascism," *Atlantic Council*, April 17, 2022, available at <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/how-putins-russia-embraced-fascism-while-preaching-anti-fascism/>.

⁴⁴ "Emmanuel Macron: Europe – It Can Die. A New Paradigm at The Sorbonne," op. cit.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ "NATO Response Force," NATO, July 27, 2023, available at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49755.htm#contribute.

⁴⁸ "Speech by NATO Deputy Secretary General Mircea Geoană at the 2B Secure Forum in Budva, Montenegro," NATO, October 7, 2023, available at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_219040.htm?selectedLocale=en.

⁴⁹ Yuliya Talmazan, "Putin says Biden is better for Russia than a Trump presidency," *NBC News*, February 15, 2024, available at <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/putin-says-biden-better-russia-trump-presidency-rcna138942>.

⁵⁰ Stephen Blank, "Russian Nuclear Strategy in the Ukraine War: An Interim Report," *Information Series*, No. 525 (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, June 15, 2022), available at https://nipp.org/information_series/stephen-blank-russian-nuclear-strategy-in-the-ukraine-war-an-interim-report-no-525-june-15-2022/.

⁵¹ Jacob W. Kipp, "Russia's Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons," *Military Review*, May-June 2001, available at https://ia903101.us.archive.org/9/items/2001_05_01_Russia_s_Nonstrategic_Nuclear_Weapons_Kipp/2001-05-01%20Russia%27s%20Nonstrategic%20Nuclear%20Weapons%20%28Kipp%29.pdf.

The National Institute for Public Policy's *Information Series* is a periodic publication focusing on contemporary strategic issues affecting U.S. foreign and defense policy. It is a forum for promoting critical thinking on the evolving international security environment and how the dynamic geostrategic landscape affects U.S. national security. Contributors are recognized experts in the field of national security. National Institute for Public Policy would like to thank the Sarah Scaife Foundation for the generous support that made this *Information Series* possible.

The views in this *Information Series* are those of the author(s) and should not be construed as official U.S. Government policy, the official policy of the National Institute for Public Policy or any of its sponsors. For additional information about this publication or other publications by the National Institute Press, contact: Editor, National Institute Press, 9302 Lee Highway, Suite 750 | Fairfax, VA 22031 | (703) 293-9181 | www.nipp.org. For access to previous issues of the National Institute Press Information Series, please visit <http://www.nipp.org/national-institute-press/informationseries/>.

© National Institute Press, 2024