Rebeccah L. Heinrichs, *Duty to Deter: American Nuclear Deterrence and the Just War Doctrine* (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, 2024), 141 pages.

There is a seemingly endless supply of books and articles on the subject of nuclear arms and deterrence. Only a fraction of these reflect expertise in the subject areas—which is why the public canon on nuclear deterrence is a decidedly mixed bag. This is particularly true of the episodic public debates about the morality of nuclear deterrence and weapons.

Commentaries on the morality of nuclear deterrence by apparently comparable learned experts often confidently reach wholly contrary conclusions. Where is one to turn when authoritative voices reach contrary conclusions without any apparent uncertainty? The best that one can do is carefully work through the competing texts and logic and try to distinguish between that which is coherent and consistent with available evidence, and that which is activist hype or political agitprop, which may unknowingly be repeated by the unsuspecting novice.

In this text, *Duty to Deter*, Dr. Rebeccah Heinrichs takes on the herculean task of examining, in a transparent and scholarly way, the moral dimensions of nuclear weapons and deterrence policy. Doing so credibly requires a fluent understanding of both moral analysis and nuclear deterrence analysis and policy—a diverse expertise that is exceedingly rare. It is an understatement to note that commentators on this arcane subject, at every level, typically appear to have a superficial familiarity with either moral analysis or deterrence policy, or both—which is one of the reasons the public canon on the subject is so uneven.

To the reader's great benefit, Dr. Heinrichs has spent years focusing on both moral analysis and nuclear deterrence policy. She brings these diverse areas of expertise to her analysis and has successfully accomplished that which, literally, only a handful of scholars has accomplished in the past almost half century—an analysis that reflects fluency in both moral analysis and nuclear deterrence policy.

Using the centuries-old Just War Doctrine and more recent Law of Armed Conflict as the moral and legal frameworks for discussion, Dr. Heinrichs has rigorously and unflinchingly examined the morality of nuclear deterrence, not in a contextual vacuum, but in full recognition of the harsh realities of international relations. The result is a uniquely valuable contemporary assessment for a new generation of policy makers and operators that applies the Just War Doctrine and legal principles to current questions of nuclear deterrence and possible employment options.

The historical backdrop for Dr. Heinrichs' study is important to understanding its value. During the 1980s, there was a flowering of analyses and commentary in the West on this subject, including by numerous church-based authors and institutions. This flowering received considerable attention but demonstrated decidedly mixed levels of expertise on the primary subjects. The majority of these works reached one of two conclusions: 1) neither the possession nor employment of nuclear weapons can be deemed moral, and correspondingly, policies of nuclear deterrence must be rejected, or; 2) the possession of nuclear weapons *for deterrence purposes* may be morally acceptable pending their

elimination under global surveillance and supervision, but *not* the employment of nuclear weapons. Two prominent Christian writers at the time went so far as to describe analysis advancing nuclear deterrence as "Satanic doublethink"[1]—the strongest possible denunciation.

In contrast, a distinct minority of these 1980s analyses concluded that the possession of nuclear weapons for deterrence purposes is a moral and strategic requirement for the U.S. government—compatible with the Just War Doctrine—as are some prospective employment options in the event deterrence fails.

The rejection of nuclear deterrence as inherently immoral was wholly contrary to long-standing U.S. nuclear policies intended to deter war with the Soviet Union. When 1980s studies by church-based institutions reached this conclusion, the Reagan Administration took note for fear of the possible departure of pious professionals from U.S. efforts to sustain nuclear deterrence against the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, formal entry into this public debate by the Reagan Administration was limited. Instead, open argument against the moral rejection of nuclear deterrence fell to a small number of prominent scholars of the time, including Colin Gray, Herman Kahn, William O'Brien, and Albert Wohlstetter.

With the close of the Reagan Administration, voguish moral criticism of U.S. nuclear deterrence policy subsided. And, less than a decade later, the subject largely disappeared altogether from public discussion with the end of the Cold War and the widespread expectation of a cooperative "new world order" in which nuclear weapons and deterrence would be relics of the past.

The decades-long, post-Cold War quiet on the subject came to an end in 2017 with the United Nations' Treaty to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). A coalition of activist organizations promoting the TPNW, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), typically expressed emotive, moral outrage against nuclear weapons and deterrence rather than analytical arguments. This advocacy on behalf of the TPNW was, and typically remains, narrowly focused on the risks of nuclear deterrence and, on that basis, declares it to be inherently immoral.

Missing from this advocacy is any apparent acknowledgement of the realities of international threats and the risks associated with an absence of nuclear deterrence—risks illustrated during the first half of the 20th Century by the 80-100 million deaths from undeterred great power wars. In 2017, the Nobel Prize Committee awarded the Nobel Peace Prize to ICAN for its lobbying on behalf of the TPNW that is unburdened by recognition of the need to deter increasingly severe nuclear threats.

Several geopolitical developments have roughly coincided with this ICAN advocacy and contributed to the revival of interest in the moral and legal analysis of nuclear deterrence. Russia, intent on recovering the power position of the collapsed Soviet Union, has expanded its nuclear arsenal and increasingly engaged in reckless, explicit nuclear threats, as has North Korea. China too is expanding its nuclear capabilities and pursuing a manifestly aggressive

[1] Ronald Sider and Richard Taylor, *Nuclear Holocaust & Christian Hope* (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1982), p. 69.

foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific area. Initially slow to move in the direction of renewed nuclear capabilities, the United States established a program to rebuild its aged nuclear arsenal. In this darkening international context, the public debate about morality and nuclear deterrence has returned.

It is in this political context that Dr. Heinrichs' new contribution to the discussion of morality and nuclear deterrence has such meaning and value. Indeed, she rightly emphasizes that both moral and strategic analyses of nuclear weapons cannot be done adequately in a political vacuum. An understanding of the international threat context and the stakes at risk is essential: If there were no grave threats to be deterred confronting the United States and allies, it would be a simple matter to conclude that policies of nuclear deterrence provide no protection and instead entail only deadly risk—and therefore cannot be morally condoned. But, as Dr. Heinrichs explains, such international amity is not the reality, the current threat context is particularly harsh, and nuclear deterrence provides unique value to prevent war.

While acknowledging the risks of nuclear deterrence, Dr. Heinrichs meticulously takes the reader through a moral and strategic analysis that reaches a conclusion that is anathema to the secular activism in favor of the TPNW and contrary to much of the church-based analysis clothed in the Just War Doctrine: Policies of nuclear deterrence can be deemed strategically essential and fashioned to meet the strict demands of the Just War Doctrine regarding *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*, i.e., the decision to use force and its actual employment. The entire artifice of the nuclear disarmament campaign is built on the arguments that nuclear weapons and deterrence are inherently immoral and harmful; Dr. Heinrichs' careful analysis persuasively concludes that sustaining nuclear deterrence not only can be moral, but is Washington's sacred duty, and that U.S. nuclear policy has been moving in the direction demanded by the Just War Doctrine and legal principles for decades.

This conclusion is profoundly counter to most of the church-based and secular commentary on the subject—commentary that typically refuses to acknowledge the manifest dangers absent nuclear deterrence in the real world. The result of Dr. Heinrichs' timely analysis is a valuable and near unique text that is carefully reasoned, scholarly and readable, and directly pertinent to contemporary questions of nuclear weapons policy.

Duty to Deter truly is a must read for anyone interested in this critical subject, but particularly so for those in government and uniform with responsibility for U.S. deterrence policy and strategy. As Dr. Heinrichs concludes, those working to help sustain U.S. nuclear deterrence strategies and capabilities can do so confident that they are contributing to an undertaking that is both moral and a fundamental responsibility of government. *Duty to Deter* also is essential reading for members of the clergy and laypersons seeking a scholarly analysis informed by the needed expertise for such a study, and by recognition of both the risks of nuclear deterrence and its value given the harsh realities of international relations.

Reviewed by Keith B. Payne
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Ilan Berman, *Challenging Moscow's Message* (Washington, D.C.: American Foreign Policy Council, 2024), 107 pages.

In *Challenging Moscow's Message*, Ilan Berman offers a useful short primer on the basics of Russia's influence operations and discusses the European Union's (EU's), Czech, Polish, Latvian, Estonian, Lithuanian, Swedish, and Finnish steps to counter Moscow's narratives. Lastly, the author discusses best practices and recommends steps that the United States can take to help counter Russia's disinformation efforts.

Using information to manipulate perceptions, and ideally cause states to voluntarily choose courses of actions beneficial to Russia, has been Russia's long-standing *modus operandi*. The method was originally necessitated by the Soviet Union's, and later Russia's, relative lack of economic and technological capabilities, which makes the prospective results of a head-on-head clash with the West unfavorable to Russia. Cheap social media make these techniques yet more potent and disruptive.

The EU's and various states' efforts to counter Russia's activities that the report chronicles are generally limited in scope, brittle, and underfunded, particularly compared to massive resources that Russia (and its friends) has been pouring into disinformation. Pro-active measures and using the same techniques against Russia in an offensive manner are barely discussed at all (in the book or in the counter-disinformation establishment), yet such activities ought to be an integral part of the West's response and as robust and comprehensive as they were during the Cold War. The case studies are rather short and provide introductory material relevant for the EU's and select countries' efforts to counter Russia's activities. They sometimes miss important context, for example, that the Czech Republic serves as a trial state for Russia's disinformation operations (to see whether the message would work in other states) or that Russia has to be extremely careful to cover its tracks in Poland, where any open affiliation with Russia compromises the disinformation efforts before they even begin.

There are significant differences between the examined countries and the United States potentially complicating efforts to replicate the more successful of their efforts in the United States. For example, the largest examined country, Poland, is a country of 38 million. Five of the analyzed countries used to be a part of the Warsaw Pact and possess good understanding of Russia's strategic culture, objectives, activities, and techniques. All of them share a societal consensus that Russia is a threat that directly challenges their national security interests.

Whole-of-society approaches, for example, would be extremely difficult to implement in the United States, a country that encompasses thousands of different cultures united under one creed. U.S. First Amendment protections (rightfully) limit the degree to which the U.S. Government can regulate the media environment relative to what is permitted on this matter in many European states. Trust in the government, which itself must be competent, is a prerequisite for a more effective government-led fight against disinformation. Polarization is at an all-time high in the United States. Berman highlights the importance of rapid

responses, coordination among different parts of the government (and with civil society and media), resilience in the form of increased media literacy, and professionalization of the field.

Lastly, the report identifies next steps in the fight against Russia's disinformation: regaining experience in Russian information warfare, which has severely degraded since the end of the Cold War; increasing resources dedicated to countering disinformation; encouraging allies, some of which are overly dependent on U.S. funding, to resource their counter-disinformation establishments independently of the United States; and, nurturing Russia's independent media. These would be good initial steps to start to reverse the asymmetry between Russia's success and the West's response. Yet, more would be required to truly counter Russia's activities, including making offensive disinformation a part of a comprehensive strategy to counter its actions.

Reviewed by Michaela Dodge
National Institute for Public Policy

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James Graham Wilson, *America's Cold Warrior: Paul Nitze and National Security from Roosevelt to Reagan* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2024), 306 pp.

In the annals of Cold War history, certain prominent individuals stand out for their unique influence on U.S. national security policy. One of those individuals is Paul H. Nitze. In his book, *America's Cold Warrior: Paul Nitze and National Security from Roosevelt to Reagan*, James Graham Wilson has produced a "political biography" of Nitze, arguing that "No other American in the twentieth century contributed to high policy as much as he did for as long as he did in both Democratic and Republican administrations."

Wilson describes Nitze's personal background and career in the private sector, including his time at Harvard, on Wall Street, and at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), which would later bear his name, as well as his government service from Franklin Delano Roosevelt to Ronald Reagan. He went from Democrat to Republican to Democrat again, and Wilson attributes Nitze's success across administrations to his "[f]inancial and political independence" and his view of himself as a "nonpartisan expert."

Wilson provides robust detail on Nitze's role in influencing the national security bureaucracy. He describes Nitze's views during the Cold War as favoring U.S. strategic superiority over the Soviet Union, and Nitze is perhaps best known as the primary architect of NSC-68, a policy document warning against the massive Soviet nuclear buildup and outlining the U.S. response. Wilson describes the period in the late 1970s when U.S. ICBMs were highly vulnerable to a Soviet first-strike, leaving U.S. leaders with the option of risking societal destruction in retaliation or capitulating, as the "Nitze Scenario," though he does not mention the term "window of vulnerability" commonly used at the time to describe this condition. Nitze was part of the "Team B" alternative assessment of Soviet military spending that led the intelligence community to revise its methodology and increase its estimate of the military burden on Soviet GDP. He was also a central figure in the Committee on the

Present Danger (CPD), a bipartisan group of former officials and national security experts who methodically and successfully helped defeat passage of the second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II), signed in 1979, while calling for a tougher approach toward the Soviet Union.

My work as a defense analyst with CPD introduced me to Nitze and I came to appreciate his intellect and the logic of his arguments against SALT II. Yet, the reader may surmise that Wilson views Nitze's role in helping defeat the treaty uncharitably, as Wilson describes Nitze's most significant contribution to U.S. national security as negotiating arms control agreements, including Nitze's failed 1982 "walk in the woods" initiative that later paved the way for the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. This view is consistent with those who share an affinity for arms control as a stabilizing good, but it is also wildly inconsistent with reality, as the history of arms control is one where the outcomes of agreements reached fell markedly short of the publicly stated expectations of U.S. officials.

Despite the author's apparent belief in the goodness of arms control and his assertion that "SALT II was hardly the abomination that Nitze alleged," Nitze's opposition to SALT II was based on an intellectually sound analysis that correctly identified the fatal flaws in the agreement and the troubling implications of ratifying a treaty that failed to stem the Soviet drive for strategic superiority. In this, Nitze and his CPD colleagues were on the right side of history.

Wilson also recounts Nitze's role in developing what came to be known as the "Nitze Criteria" for strategic defenses—a formula that some supporters of the Reagan Administration's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) characterized as an attempt to undermine, if not kill, Reagan's desire for a comprehensive missile defense system that could defend the homeland from Soviet missile attack. The "Nitze Criteria" stated that any U.S. missile defense system must be effective, survivable, and "cost-effective at the margin," i.e., so cheap to add defensive interceptors that the Soviets would have no incentive to add offensive missiles to overwhelm them. Yet, the focus on "cost-effectiveness at the margin" has repeatedly been used by some critics as a cudgel to argue against missile defense by asserting that the cost of defending against missile attack is greater than the cost of building offensive missiles to saturate the defense. These critics, however, ignore the distinction between cost and value. Indeed, the cost of rebuilding a city in the event of deterrence failure would far exceed the cost of adding defensive capabilities intended to prevent such a catastrophe in the first place. In this regard, the value of a missile defense system that prevents such a disastrous outcome has a value that far exceeds its cost.

Wilson recounts some additional positions Nitze advocated as he worked to achieve arms control agreements with the Soviet Union, including suggesting SDI could be scaled back and proposing to include British and French nuclear forces in a follow-on strategic arms treaty. Both suggestions met with criticism from more hawkish analysts. As Wilson notes, "Paul Nitze never stopped trying to get a strategic arms agreement," and he writes that the subsequent 1991 START I agreement "was based on the framework that Nitze" and other experts had developed years earlier.

Later in his career, Nitze argued for the elimination of nuclear weapons, supported ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), opposed NATO enlargement, and viewed climate change as the most significant post-Cold War national security threat. Wilson conveys that Nitze both "opposed limited nuclear war" and "total nuclear war." Of course, I have yet to meet anyone who favored either. The debate has never been about who favors or opposes nuclear war, but rather what is the best way to prevent it.

The book provides rich detail on Nitze's life, the evolution of his stature in government, and the ascendency of his political views within multiple administrations. Despite Nitze's strong differences with the Carter Administration, Wilson writes that he was a "formidable political force" and was "impossible to ignore." Yet, the reader is left with a sense that Wilson views Nitze's concerns over Soviet military superiority as overblown. "Nitze, as so often, painted a grim picture," Wilson writes. Indeed, Wilson asserts that Nitze's concerns about the Soviet leadership under Mikhail Gorbachev "leveraging its strategic advantage" did not materialize and "negated his entire theory of nuclear weapons and risk taking."

In addition, Wilson's portrayal of Nitze suggests that many of his positions were based on reactions to others' criticisms, perceived slights, and resentments. For example, he implies that Nitze "bitterly attacked his onetime friend, Paul Warnke," after President Carter nominated Warnke instead of him to lead the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and to be chief negotiator for SALT II. He also states that Nitze "resented that policy advisors within the Bush administration failed to consult him."

Wilson contends that Nitze's career "inspired those figures who had served in government and were attempting to shift the terms of national security debates while carving out roles for themselves in future presidential administrations." While asserting that Nitze was "both correct and wrong about many things," Wilson appears to believe that Nitze's success was due, at least in part, to the advantages of race, gender, and social status. He attributes Nitze's career and professional longevity to his "status as a white male born to privilege," arguing that more people should consider following Nitze's path in helping formulate U.S. national security policy, "especially people who did not come from the same elite background as he did." Notwithstanding contemporary debates over "diversity, equity, and inclusion" in government, there is no disputing that Nitze's intellect was formidable and his accomplishments in the national security realm substantial.

Whatever one thinks of Paul Nitze, *America's Cold Warrior: Paul Nitze and National Security from Roosevelt to Reagan*, is well worth reading. No author is completely objective in their portrayal of historical figures and the policies they advocated, and Wilson's book is no exception. Nevertheless, it is extensively documented, provides significant historical data, and tells a fascinating story.

Reviewed by David J. Trachtenberg
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Aaron Bateman, *Weapons in Space: Technology, Politics, and the Rise and Fall of the Strategic Defense Initiative* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2024), 336 pages.

President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) was one of the most controversial decisions in U.S. Cold War history, in no small part because the assumptions behind it and its implications touched nearly every facet of defense policy: nuclear strategy, military operations, research and technology, and alliances to name a few. It is no small feat, therefore, that Aaron Bateman, an assistant professor at George Washington University, has written a dispassionate, comprehensive, and insightful study of the subject.

Indeed, Bateman evinces no ideological bias for or against SDI, a fact that sent at least one reviewer into near apoplexy—but which this reviewer found refreshing.[2] One hesitates to attempt summarizing such a vast project on such a vast subject, but in essence Bateman argues that SDI cannot be analyzed in a vacuum because it was part of a far broader U.S. political and military strategy that utilized, and even depended upon, space as a warfighting domain. The highly secretive nature of U.S. activities in space, combined with the cutting-edge technology deployed there, meant that historians have either overlooked or not been able to pierce the classification veil until recently—making Bateman's work highly valuable as the broader context around SDI becomes clearer.

Bateman begins his book in the decades before President Reagan's 1983 announcement of SDI and provides succinct summaries of the Outer Space Treaty, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and other key Cold War efforts aimed at controlling state behavior in space, among other measures. One of the stated purposes of Bateman's work is to demonstrate that SDI, and indeed many other programs, were the products of a host of factors, not just narrow military applications. They were often shaped by the international agreements mentioned above, plus the personalities of their supporters, political relationships, economic considerations, and diplomatic concerns. SDI, as the author reminds the reader often, was not just one program aimed at one problem, but rather a set of efforts in multiple domains with different goals, timelines, and political sensitivities.

Bateman argues convincingly that President Reagan viewed SDI as a vehicle for both competition and cooperation with the Soviet Union, an endeavor that appeared contradictory at times, but one that he believed would ultimately advance U.S. national interests. Indeed, President Reagan issued no fewer than six different national security decision directives (NSDDs) over his eight years that addressed the purposes behind SDI and how U.S. officials should discuss those purposes with various constituencies. Reagan Administration officials did not so much change SDI's goals, *per se*, but added on to them to meet the needs of the moment, both domestically and internationally.

Bateman's work also helpfully traces U.S. decision-making on key military space capabilities and demonstrates they were not driven by a mechanistic "action-reaction"

[2] Joe Cirincione, "Weapons in Space: Technology, Politics, and the Rise and Fall of the Strategic Defense Initiative," *Arms Control Today*, Vol. 54, No. 6 (July/August 2024), available at https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2024-07/book-reviews/weapons-space-technology-politics-and-rise-and-fall-strategic-defense.

model that many presume formed the foundation for much of U.S. policy during the Cold War. Instead, much like U.S. decisions on nuclear and other missile defense capabilities, U.S. officials weighed the political, military, and economic tradeoffs in pursuing each space capability in ways that were unique to the American strategic culture and not in lockstep reaction to perceived Soviet actions.

Bateman's work is also useful in busting several longstanding myths surrounding SDI, such as: that the scientist Edward Teller was almost solely responsible for encouraging President Reagan's pursuit of missile defense; that most scientists at the time were dismissive about the prospects of space-based defense; and, that the majority of the costs associated with SDI were spent on exotic and never fielded interceptors.

Among the more interesting chapters in Bateman's work are those on allied reactions to and support of SDI. When examining the various sub-projects of SDI that were undoubtedly primarily tasked with enabling a capable weapon system, it is easy to focus almost exclusively on the military and political dimensions, but Bateman correctly points the reader toward a broader aperture that includes economic and diplomatic considerations. Some U.S. allied leaderships were in principle against upending the strategic orthodoxy of the day, or even appearing to question it, where mutual vulnerability claimed a near immutable place in nuclear strategy. But, in practice, they weighed these military / strategic considerations against the prospective economic and diplomatic benefits that might accrue from cooperating with the United States—and most chose open, if relatively muted, cooperation.

Bateman carries the narrative from the transition to "Brilliant Eyes" and "Brilliant Pebbles" from President Reagan to President Bush, and finally to these programs' demise in President Clinton's Administration. Although Bateman did not seemingly set out to write a "myth-busting" book about SDI, his evident commitment to a "just the facts" approach on a polarized subject nevertheless busts several more myths beyond the ones cited above, including revelations that DoD and allied officials believed there were no "showstoppers" in their assessments about the general technological feasibility of kinetic space-based interceptors, and that much of SDI's investments were in foundational intercept-enabling technology, not just "exotic" interceptors.

One element of the SDI story that Bateman does not address as much as might have been useful are what might be termed "SDI alarmists." Bateman, for good and justifiable reasons, spends a few pages on "SDI enthusiasts" as a driving force behind Reagan's thinking, both pre- and post-SDI announcement. The greatest hopes of the most enthusiastic supporters did not come to pass, clearly, but it would have been nice to include a balanced discussion on how the worst of the alarmists' predictions, specifically on the effect SDI would have on arms control, did not come to pass either.[3]

Bateman should be commended for his archival research, especially in the under-explored areas of internal Reagan Administration deliberations and allied reactions to SDI. *Weapons in Space* will serve as a useful case study in a number of subject areas and, given

[3] See, for instance, Raymond L. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1985), pp. 1026-1028.

the apparent renaissance in interest in homeland missile defenses in the United States, will offer valuable lessons for researchers and policymakers for years to come.

Reviewed by Matthew R. Costlow
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Matthew Kroenig and Dan Negrea, *We Win, They Lose*: *Republican Foreign Policy & the New Cold War* (Washington, D.C.: Republic Book Publishers, 2024), 220 pp.

Kroenig and Negrea's Plan for Winning the New Cold War*

These are turbulent times for the United States. Amidst Russia starting the largest land war in Europe since World War II, China's revanchism buttressed by massive nuclear and conventional modernization, and challenges from increasingly-capable actors like Iran and North Korea, the United States is sorely in need of an effective strategy to preserve the world order it has so painstakingly built and maintained over the past 80 years. The endpoint of American foreign policy is clear: we win, they lose. Yet, the roadmap to getting there remains a serious matter of debate. Matthew Kroenig and Dan Negrea, not ones to shy away from a challenge, offer organizing principles for a better U.S. foreign policy in their aptly-titled book, *We Win, They Lose*: *Republican Foreign Policy & the New Cold War.*

In seeking to build a strategy with the greatest chance of success in the contemporary threat environment, the authors analyze the foreign and defense policies of several past administrations, Republican and Democrat. Synthesizing these into a forward-looking approach, the authors offer an outline of a Republican foreign policy inspired by what worked well under Reagan and Trump. The authors support their case with sound analysis examining why progressive foreign policy approaches lead America to more peril, not less, providing practical illustrations from Biden's tenure. These cautionary lessons include lacking a coherent strategy and consistency in statements and actions in countering China's belligerence; the abysmal execution of the withdrawal from Afghanistan; failure to sustain pressure on Iran; choosing not to secure U.S. energy independence; and botching efforts to deter Russia in Ukraine.

In doing so, Kroenig and Negrea show that the Republicans are much less divided on foreign and defense issues than would seem so at first glance. Nevertheless, one can hardly shake the perception that serious divisions within the party do exist, and that implementing a consensus in practice will be difficult. Furthermore, if one can be achieved, little support can be expected from the Democratic Party with a very different concept of what best serves U.S. foreign and defense policy interests.

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* *This book review first appeared online on Providence's web site (https://providencemag.com/). The author is grateful for the permission to republish the piece here.*

The book starts, however, with the more foundational question of why the United States needs a foreign policy at all. The authors go on to outline the broad areas where there has a been bipartisan consensus, such as the need to defend the U.S. homeland; preventing a hostile power from dominating an important geopolitical region; maintaining peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East; stopping proliferation of nuclear weapons; countering anti-American terrorist groups globally; securing the global commons; advancing a free and fair global economic system; and making the world safer for democracy.

Regarding the areas of divergence between the parties, Kroenig and Negrea are incisive, asking what outcomes the distinct approaches produced in the past. "When America is strong, its adversaries will not mess with it. But a weak America invites aggression," the authors remind us. Republicans generally know America is worth fighting for, that the United States must have the tools to prevail in the fight, and that these tools must be used correctly. In this, they differ from many Democrats, who see the exercise of U.S. power as the source of the problem, rather than a part of a solution. This worldview holds that voluntarily restraining the United States could show goodwill and make the world safer through our example.

Against this background, the authors discuss what is wrong with U.S. foreign and defense policy, particularly the myopathies of Biden's foreign policy worldview. The authors analyze the connections between the Biden Administration's suboptimal policies and the negative consequences for the United States and its allies. The authors' clear critique of the failures of the Biden Administration is particularly welcome given the hesitancy of the foreign policy establishment to criticize Democratic presidents, something Negrea and Kroenig have no qualms about.

Kroenig and Negrea propose an alternative foreign policy inspired by Reagan's "peace through strength" mantra as well as the sounder parts of Trump's defense and foreign policy. Some may argue that the authors are too generous in overlooking the more problematic aspects of Trump's foreign policy. Yet, not every Trump Administration's decision was wrong and acknowledging as much is a necessary step in building the best strategies to counter contemporary challenges to U.S. interests. The alternative is to be distracted by polemics regarding the consequences of Trump's behavior while our adversaries continue to gain ground. In this task, they succeed.

The book examines various instruments of state power from economics to American exceptionalism, a welcome addition lacking in the usual treatments of defense and foreign policy. The authors discuss theories of victory with respect to each of the most serious U.S. challengers: China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, as well as how to successfully address energy and climate challenges, and—an issue of particular importance to the Republican base—border security and immigration.

The book is a useful primer for those interested in the betterment of U.S. foreign policy, but it also demonstrates that, contra perceptions of total discord within the Republican Party and society in general, there are points of consensus upon which future administrations can

build. More importantly, Kroenig and Negrea lay out foreign and defense policy approaches that are most likely to keep America and its allies safe well into the future.

Reviewed by Michaela Dodge
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