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European Allies’ Views of Russia’s Nuclear Policy after the Escalation of Its War in Ukraine

Dr. Michaela Dodge
Dr. Michaela Dodge is a Research Scholar at the National Institute for Public Policy.

Russia’s nuclear threats have not gone unnoticed among citizens of European nations, including in those countries that reportedly host U.S. battlefield (also sometimes called tactical or short-range) nuclear weapons (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey[1]). The public debates over hosting U.S. nuclear weapons as a part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) nuclear mission in various European states prior to the escalation of Russia’s war in Ukraine were generally sporadic and often negative, including in those countries that reportedly host U.S. nuclear weapons.[2] The situation appears to have changed after February 2022.

Perspectives of Allied States Hosting U.S. Nuclear Weapons Prior to Russia’s Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine

Despite some of their citizens’ reluctance, NATO member states’ governments have been able to sustain a political consensus on the importance of nuclear weapons for their security. Every Strategic Concept since the end of the Cold War, plus the 2012 Deterrence and Defence Posture Review, emphasized the importance of nuclear weapons for allied security.[3] Starting in 2010, under the continuing influence of the post-Cold War optimism and President Obama’s vision to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons, NATO’s Strategic Concept documents committed the Alliance to pursuing a nuclear-free world. They also reiterated the nuclear weapons’ role as the “supreme guarantee of the security of the Alliance” and maintained that NATO will remain a nuclear alliance for as long as nuclear weapons exist.[4] Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine and its subsequent belligerent nuclear threats forced NATO’s attention back on the importance of strengthening nuclear deterrence.[5]

The United States is not the only nuclear-armed member of NATO. Two of the European NATO member states, France and the United Kingdom, have nuclear weapons of their own. France reportedly retains fewer than 300 nuclear warheads that can be delivered by submarine-launched ballistic missiles or aircraft.[6] France does not participate in NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group, where the other member states discuss nuclear policy issues pertinent to the Alliance. The United Kingdom has no more than 260 warheads in its stockpile and is the only recognized nuclear weapon state that reduced its nuclear weapon capabilities to a single delivery system, submarines that can launch U.S.-made Trident II D5 missiles.[7] The Alliance recognizes that these forces “have a deterrent role of their own and contribute significantly to the overall security of the Alliance.”[8] The “separate centres of decision-making contribute to deterrence by complicating the calculations of potential adversaries.”[9]

Historically, NATO’s European member states have been concerned about the credibility of U.S. nuclear guarantees; after all, that is a basic reason for France and the United Kingdom developing their independent nuclear deterrents in the first place. The problem became particularly pronounced when the Soviets reached strategic parity with the United States in the 1970s.[10] It contributed to the development of Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger’s Limited Nuclear Options that did not involve a large-scale nuclear attack against Soviet territory in response to a Soviet attack on U.S. allies.[11] Yet, in 1979, President Nixon’s Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger stated at a conference in Brussels, “Don’t you Europeans keep asking us to multiply assurances that we cannot possibly mean; and that if we mean them, we should not want to execute; and that if we execute, we’ll destroy civilization.”[12]

The collapse of the Soviet Union gave the United States additional time to resolve the difficulties inherent in providing credible extended deterrence and assurances to its allies. But the era of strategic optimism and large-scale nuclear weapon reductions by the United States—in some cases, unilateral—led to an atrophy of U.S. intellectual interest and physical infrastructure supporting the nuclear enterprise. In the wake of the West’s Cold War success, nuclear weapon topics fell off the radar in what has been called an extended “strategic holiday.” The United States and allies have generally stopped investing in the intellectual infrastructure underpinning the nuclear enterprise, and largely have forgotten the important role that the U.S. ability to compete in the nuclear realm had on the Cold War’s successful outcome.

While the European states’ continued hosting of U.S. nuclear weapons is a sign of their political commitment to maintaining a “nuclear Alliance,” their general unwillingness to spend two percent of GDP on defense is yet again a salient problem in the U.S. post-9/11 fiscal environment.[13] In his last speech as Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates warned:

The blunt reality is that there will be dwindling appetite and patience in the U.S. Congress—and in the American body politic writ large—to expend increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations that are apparently unwilling to devote the necessary resources or make the necessary changes to be serious and capable partners in their own defense. Nations apparently willing and eager for American taxpayers to assume the growing security burden left by reductions in European defense budgets [sic]. Indeed, if current trends in the decline of European defense capabilities are not halted and reversed, Future [sic] U.S. political leaders—those for whom the Cold War was not the formative experience that it was for me—may not consider the return on America’s investment in NATO worth the cost.[14]

His warning was prescient as President Donald Trump reportedly considered withdrawing the United States from NATO a few years later.[15] The anxiety about a potential change in the U.S. strategic direction and focus on China contributed to some of the earlier debates about an independent European nuclear deterrent, although prospects for one remained distant.[16] In Germany, such a debate was unprecedented,[17] even as prospects for it changing the status quo were extremely low.[18]

A distinct fear in allied states has been related to the effects of potential nuclear weapons use on their own territory and the belief that nuclear weapons have no military utility beyond being an instrument of deterrence and an important sign of a U.S. political commitment to NATO. As recently as 2021, a majority of Germans, private citizens and government officials, strongly disagreed with any U.S. nuclear weapon use in hypothetical scenarios that included Russia’s invasion of the Baltic states (NATO members).[19] According to the same survey, the German public was skeptical with regard to the deterrent effect of U.S. nuclear weapons reportedly stationed in Germany (particularly among the younger generation).[20] With Russia’s escalation of its war in Ukraine and attendant nuclear threats that sentiment appears to be changing.  According to a June 2022 survey, more than half of the German population now believe in the deterrent value of nuclear weapons.[21] This event made clear that the era of strategic optimism and expectations of a benign “new world order” have rightly come to an end.

After Russia’s February 2022 Invasion

For the most part, calls for a nuclear-free world have taken a back seat in the mainstream national security discussions after Russia’s escalation of its war in Ukraine in February 2022. Russia’s brandishing of nuclear threats has spurred renewed interest in matters of deterrence, regional challenges, and the roles of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons in allied assurance and extended deterrence.[22

Research conducted after Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine indicates an allied shift toward acknowledging the importance of nuclear weapons and supporting the host nation’s role among the Dutch and German publics.[23] For example, over half of the Dutch population now believe that U.S. nuclear weapons reportedly stationed on their territory deter a nuclear attack against NATO.[24] A June 2022 survey also documented a significant increase in the respondents’ willingness to support nuclear weapons use in certain scenarios and fewer respondents support a withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe.[25] It is not clear how lasting this shift will prove, but because Russia is unlikely to stop its nuclear threats anytime soon, the tendency is likely to persist for the foreseeable future.

Yet, Russia’s invasion has called into question the wisdom of the near-complete, unilateral U.S. short-range nuclear weapon reductions of the early 1990s, and the pursuit of nuclear enterprise policies that left it unable to rapidly adapt to a deteriorating nuclear environment, despite the commitment expressed in all post-Cold War Nuclear Posture Reviews (NPRs) to rectify the problem. The war has exposed the abysmal state of Europe’s defense and industrial base to produce conventional weapons on a scale required by a modern large-scale conflict.[26] The U.S. industrial production base has not fared much better, even though the United States has more resources to address the challenge.[27]

The war has also highlighted a general lack of interest, knowledge, and understanding among European publics and governments regarding nuclear weapons policy and strategy issues.[28] The communities interested and knowledgeable in these matters remain very small, particularly in countries that do not have their own nuclear weapons or do not host U.S. nuclear weapons.[29] There remains a segment of allied populations committed to the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe. How to strengthen the credibility of U.S. nuclear guarantees in the face of Russia’s open and somewhat successful attempts to exploit its tactical nuclear superiority in the conduct of its foreign policy has yet again become an important topic of transatlantic discussions.

In this context, signs point to all not being well with the U.S. goal of assuring allies.[30] Polish President Andrzej Duda stated that, “The problem above all is that we [Poles] don’t have nuclear weapons” and that the topic of Polish participation in nuclear sharing is open.[31] In July 2023, prominent European experts and politicians argued that Germany, France, and the United Kingdom ought to develop their own “European” nuclear deterrent under the Supreme Allied Commander Europe’s command in order to strengthen credibility vis-à-vis Russia.[32] (In this particular proposal, the arrangement would require that German aircraft be equipped to carry French nuclear warheads, not that Germany develops nuclear weapons of its own.[33])

Other experts reminded the audience that some European states, including the relatively small ones, had nuclear weapon programs in the past and that perhaps the time might be ripe to start discussions about potential nuclear-sharing arrangements in which other European states contribute toward the French nuclear deterrent in exchange for a say in nuclear planning and deployment.[34] Since the United Kingdom is not a part of the European Union anymore, the potential contribution of British nuclear weapons to this European “independent” nuclear deterrent is usually discussed somewhat tangentially.

An April 14, 2022 article in the popular German magazine Spiegel International observed that, “Dependence on American nukes could ultimately be more dangerous than dependence on Russian gas.” It cited U.S. unpredictability and the U.S. strategic focus on China as the main arguments for why European states should work toward an independent European nuclear deterrent and not rely on U.S. nuclear guarantees.[35] Such discussions would have been unthinkable even a decade ago. Despite voices in the United States wanting Europe to step up and provide more for its own defense, an indigenous European nuclear deterrent could end up fracturing the Alliance rather than strengthening it.[36]

In short, questions about the future direction of NATO’s nuclear policy remain. Going forward, signs indicate that it might be difficult to work out a common strong position because of differing perceptions and substantive disagreements on the nature of the contemporary security environment and how best to address it. This disagreement includes differing perceptions among allies on what actions are considered escalatory in the context of their support for Ukraine and countering Russia’s belligerence.

For an example of differing perspectives, researchers at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs documented the West’s and Russia’s nuclear rhetoric and escalation management approaches in their September 2022 report.[37] The study codes the statements as “escalatory,” “warning,” and “de-escalatory.” Generally, the authors coded the West’s statements that were desirable from a Russian policy perspective as “de-escalatory,” even if following their underlining rationale would contribute to Ukraine’s defeat. It seems highly unlikely that some other NATO members would agree with characterizing the same statements as “de-escalatory” since their perspective of de-escalation and advancing the West’s interest involves Russia leaving Ukraine as soon as possible.[38]

In the same research, between January and August 2022, the West is judged to have made nearly an equivalent number of “escalatory” statements as Russia, the indisputable aggressor in its escalation of the war against Ukraine and the source of explicit and continuing nuclear threats against the West (Russia’s five to the West’s four).[39]  This interpretation of what constitutes “escalatory” or “de-escalatory” statements reflects a continuing unwillingness to acknowledge the all-important context in which such statements are made, in this case Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and its accompanying human rights atrocities and war crimes.  This suggests the need to maintain the pretense of an equivalence between Russia and the West in terms of goals and means when no such equivalence exists.

Researchers also coded U.S. Minuteman ICBM test rescheduling and cancellation as “de-escalatory.”[40] It is highly doubtful that the rescheduling and cancellation of the test was de-escalatory, and it is more likely that the opposite is true because Russia may interpret it as a sign of weakness. The first scheduled test after Russia’s February 2022 invasion had been planned long before Russia invaded Ukraine.[41] The tests are a critical component of U.S. nuclear forces readiness, which contributes to assurance and extended deterrence.[42] Cancelling them for a fear of provoking Russia in the midst of Moscow’s explicit and often crude nuclear threats does not bode well for allied assurance.

Conclusion

Russia’s escalation of its war in Ukraine appears to have altered, at least temporarily, European NATO member states’ perceptions regarding the importance of nuclear deterrence in their security architectures. The situation is unlikely to change in the near future due to Russia’s imperial ambitions that threaten more recent NATO members that joined the Alliance after the end of the Cold War and that removes past hopes of incorporating Russia into the modern democratic and security system.

Debates about the potential necessity for the United States to expand its nuclear arsenal are conducted in a pragmatic manner, without the previous almost unshakable dedication to a nuclear-free world. Allies appear to have rediscovered their appreciation of U.S. forward-deployed nuclear systems. Under these contemporary conditions, U.S. nuclear reductions—near-universally applauded by allies in the past—are more likely to be perceived as undermining allied assurance and damaging to alliance politics and security.

[1] Hans Kristensen, Matt Korda, “Nuclear Notebook: United States nuclear weapons, 2023,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 16, 2023, available at https://thebulletin.org/premium/2023-01/nuclear-notebook-united-states-nuclear-weapons-2023/.

[2] Michal Onderco, Michal Smetana, and Tom Etienne, “Hawks in the making? European public views on nuclear weapons post-Ukraine,” Global Policy, January 5, 2023, available at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/1758-5899.13179.

[3] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, April 24, 1999 available at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_27433.htm; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, November 2010, available at https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20120214_strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Deterrence and Defence Posture Review, May 20, 2012, available at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_87597.htm; and, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, June 29, 2022, available at https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf.

[4] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, op. cit.; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, op. cit., p. 14; and, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, op. cit., p. 8.

[5] Alexander Vershbow, “Reflections on NATO Deterrence in the 21st Century,” Texas National Security Roundtable, August 23, 2021, available at https://tnsr.org/roundtable/policy-roundtable-the-future-of-trans-atlantic-nuclear-deterrence/.

[6] Hans Kristensen, Matt Korda, and Eliana Johns, “French nuclear weapons, 2023,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 79, No. 4 (2023), pp. 272-273, available at https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/French-nuclear-weapons-2023.pdf.

[7] Claire Mills, “Nuclear weapons at a glance: United Kingdom,” House of Commons Library Research Briefing, May 3, 2023, p. 4, available at https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-9077/CBP-9077.pdf.

[8] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, op. cit., p. 8.

[9] Ibid.

[10x] David J. Trachtenberg, Michaela Dodge and Keith B. Payne, The “Action-Reaction” Arms Race Narrative vs. Historical Realities (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, 2021), pp. 31-38, available at https://nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Action-Reaction-pub.pdf.

[11] Ibid.

[12] “World: Kissinger on NATO,” Time, September 17, 1979, available at https://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,920653,00.html.

[13] The exceptions are the United States, Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and the United Kingdom.

[14] Robert Gates, Robert Gates’ farewell speech on NATO, June 10, 2011, available at https://www.voltairenet.org/article170425.html.

[15] Julian Barnes, Helene Cooper, “Trump Discussed Pulling U.S. From NATO, Aides Say Amid New Concerns Over Russia,” The New York Times, January 14, 2019, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/14/us/politics/nato-president-trump.html.

[16] Michael Rühle, “Daydream Believers,” Berlin Policy Journal, November 23, 2016, available at https://berlinpolicyjournal.com/daydream-believers/.

[17] Ulrich Kühn, “The Sudden German Nuke Flirtation,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 6, 2016, available at https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/12/06/sudden-german-nuke-flirtation-pub-66366.

[18] Hans Rühle and Michael Rühle, “German Nukes: The Phantom Menace,” Information Series No. 419 (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, March 22, 2017), available at https://nipp.org/information_series/ruhle-hans-and-michael-ruhle-german-nukes-the-phantom-menace-information-series-no-419/#_ednref6.

[19] Michal Onderco and Michal Smetana, “German views on US nuclear weapons in Europe: public and elite perspectives,” European Security, Vol. 30, No. 4 (2021), p. 640, available at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epdf/10.1080/09662839.2021.1941896?needAccess=true&role=button.

[20] Ibid., p. 641.

[21] Onderco, Smetana, and Etienne, “Hawks in the making? European public views on nuclear weapons post-Ukraine,” op. cit., p. 310.

[22] For an excellent and comprehensive treatment of Russia’s nuclear forces and policy, see Mark Schneider, “How Many Nuclear Weapons Does Russia Have? The Size and Characteristics of the Russian Nuclear Stockpile,” Occasional Paper, Vol. 3, No. 8 (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, August 2023), available at https://nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Vol.-3-No.-8.pdf.

[23] Onderco, Smetana, and Etienne, “Hawks in the making? European public views on nuclear weapons post-Ukraine,” op. cit., p. 309.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid., pp. 311, 313.

[26] Laura Kayali, Lili Bayer, and Joshua Posaner, “Europe’s military buildup: More talk than action,” Politico, June 14, 2023, available at https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-military-industry-defense-buildup-war/.

[27 Michael Hirsh, “The Pentagon Is Freaking Out About a Potential War With China,” Politico, June 9, 2023, available at https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2023/06/09/america-weapons-china-00100373.

[28] Liviu Horovitz and Lydia Wachs, “France’s Nuclear Weapons and Europe,” German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Comment, No. 15, March 2023, p. 6, available at https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/comments/2023C15_Frances_NuclearWeapons.pdf.

[29] Ibid.

[30] For a more detailed analysis of this trend, see Michaela Dodge, Alliance Politics In a Multipolar World, Occasional Paper, Vol. 2, No. 10 (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, October 2022), available at https://nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/OP-Vol.-2-No.-10.pdf; and, Keith B. Payne and Michaela Dodge, “Emerging Challenges to Extended Deterrence, Assurance and the Future of U.S. Alliances,” Information Series, No. 555 (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, June 5, 2023), available at https://nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/IS-555.pdf.

[31] Quoted in, Jo Harper, “Poland in talks to join NATO nuclear sharing program,” Anadolu Agency, October 5, 2022, available at https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/poland-in-talks-to-join-nato-nuclear-sharing-program/2703041.

[32] Jacques Lanxade, Denis MacShane, Margarita Mathiopoulos, and Klaus Naumann, “Europe needs a nuclear deterrent of its own,” New Atlanticist, July 11, 2023, available at https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/europe-needs-a-nuclear-deterrent-of-its-own/.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Tomi Huhtanen, “The war in Ukraine is forcing Europe to develop its own nuclear deterrence,” Euractiv, September 19, 2022, available at https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence-and-security/opinion/the-war-in-ukraine-is-forcing-europe-to-develop-its-own-nuclear-deterrence/.

[35] René Pfister, Britta Sandberg and Christoph Schult, “Debate over Nuclear Deterrence Heats Up in the EU,” Spiegel International, April 14, 2022, available at https://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/a-european-bomb-debate-over-nuclear-deterrence-heats-up-in-the-eu-a-88ab0869-67c6-4bc9-bdff-75c32340b56c.

[36] Horovitz and Wachs, “France’s Nuclear Weapons and Europe,” op. cit., p. 2.

[37] Anna Clara Arndt and Liviu Horovitz, “Nuclear rhetoric and escalation management in Russia’s war against Ukraine: a chronology,” Stiftung Wissenshaft und Politic, Working Paper No. 3, September 2022, available at https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/arbeitspapiere/Arndt-Horovitz_Working-Paper_Nuclear_rhetoric_and_escalation_management_in_Russia_s_war_against_Ukraine.pdf.

[38] “Finland’s PM rejects idea Putin needs an ‘off-ramp’ and simply suggests Russia leaves Ukraine,” Sky News, October 7, 2022, available at https://news.sky.com/video/finlands-pm-rejects-idea-putin-needs-an-off-ramp-and-simply-suggests-russia-leaves-ukraine-12714857.

[39] Arndt and Horovitz, “Nuclear rhetoric and escalation management in Russia’s war against Ukraine: a chronology,”op. cit., p. 8.

[40] Liviu Horovitz and Martha Stolze, “Nuclear rhetoric and escalation management in Russia’s war against Ukraine: A chronology,” Stiftung Wissenshaft und Politic, Working Paper, No. 2, August 2023, p. 8, available at https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/arbeitspapiere/Horovitz_and_Stolze_-_Nuclear_Chrono_Final_2August2023.pdf.

[41] Eric Edelman and Frank Miller, “Understanding That Weakness Is Provocative Is Deterrence 101,” The Dispatch, August 8, 2022, available at https://thedispatch.com/article/understanding-that-weakness-is-provocative/; and, Tom Rogan, “Biden’s foolish US nuclear missile test cancellation,” Washington Examiner, March 3, 2022, available at https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/restoring-america/courage-strength-optimism/bidens-foolish-us-nuclear-missile-test-cancellation.

[42] Edelman and Miller, “Understanding That Weakness Is Provocative Is Deterrence 101,” Ibid.

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